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STUDENT SPEECH REGULATION BY 
APPLYING THE HOSTILE WORK 
ENVIRONMENT ANALYSIS TO 
CYBERBULLYING 
By Carla DiB!asio* 
INTRODUCTION 
Lindsey is a sixteen-year-old sophomore who logs onto her Face-
book1 page once she gets home from school. Lindsey updates her sta-
tus and writes on her Facebook wall, "Amy is a fat cow. Don't ever 
talk to that cow, just tell her MOO." Katie is a fourteen-year-old 
eighth grade student at the same school. She decides to update her 
Facebook status after school and writes, "In case you didn't already 
know it, I'm the S*#%. Everyone else should go to hell." Are these 
instances where Lindsey and Katie are protected by their First 
Amendment free speech rights? Or, may their public school district 
punish them for their cyber speech? 
* J.D. candidate, 2012, Case Western Reserve University School of Law. 
Associate Coordinator, Journal of Law, Technology & the Internet; President, Inter-
national Law Society. I offer special thanks to my sister, Christina DiBlasio, whose 
incredible strength and integrity helped to inspire the topic of this Note. I would like 
to extend additional thanks to a mentor, Beth Rankin, who always inspires grammati-
cal diligence and academic excellence. 
1 Facebook is a social networking website that is operated and privately 
owned by Facebook, Inc. In addition to other functions, users may create a personal 
profile, add other users as friends, exchange messages, and join common interest 
groups. As of December 2011, Facebook has more than 845 million active users, 
which is about one person for every eight in the world. See Facebook Fact Sheet, at 
http://www.facebook.com/press/info. php ?factsheet. 
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As the use of social media, and the attendant cyberbullying, be-
comes increasingly prevalent, high school officials will struggle to 
determine if they can sanction their students for making similar com-
ments without infringing their students' free speech rights. 2 Unfortu-
nately, the Supreme Court cases that deal with student free speech 
rights leave lower courts and school districts ill-equipped to cope with 
the ever-increasing problem of off-campus speech in the form of 
cyberbullying. 
This Note explores the scope of a student's right to free "cyber 
speech" on social networking websites. Part I defines cyberbullying 
and illustrates that it is an emerging problem confronting today's 
schools. Part II examines the Supreme Court cases dealing with stu-
dent free speech rights, known as the "Tinker Tetralogy," and discuss-
es why that precedent has a limited application to cyberbullying. Part 
III explains that a new test is needed so that schools and courts alike 
can effectively protect victims of cyberbullying, while still protecting 
student speech that does not target victims. Part IV explains that the 
hostile work environment analysis used in Title VII employment dis-
crimination cases and the sexual harassment analysis used in Title IX 
education cases provide a useful starting point for a new cyberbully-
ing test. Part V outlines this Note's proposed test, which incorporates 
the four-factor analysis set forth in Title VII's hostile work environ-
ment claims and draws on similarities between the workplace and the 
classroom. Part VI explains how the test is applied and illustrates that 
this test operates like a sliding scale and is flexible enough to deal 
with the constant evolution of cyberspace and cyberbulling. 
Ultimately, this test will enable schools to discern the level of 
perniciousness of the cyber speech to determine whether the speech 
rises to the level of "cyberbullying," such that school action is justi-
fied and, indeed, required. In other words, this test helps schools and 
courts discover the point at which a student's right to free speech 
transgresses a student's right to be protected from cyberbullying and a 
hostile learning environment. It is at this point that a school has the 
duty to limit the cyberbully's speech and protect the victim of cyber-
bullying.3 
2 Teens and Cyberbullying: An Executive Summary on a Report on Re-
search, NATIONAL CRIME PREVENTION COUNCIL (Feb. 28, 2007), 
http://www.ncpc.org/resources/files/pdf/bullying/Teens%20and%20Cyberbullying%2 
0Research%20Study.pdf (Teens aged 13 to 17 are a growing online population. Their 
access to these electronic communication tools is present in many settings: at home, at 
school, at friends' houses, and even at public libraries and WiFi sites). 
3 The school's duty to intervene assumes that the school has actual 
knowledge of the speech. 
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I. CYBERBULL YING: A GROWING PROBLEM 
Cyberbullying is online abuse that involves juveniles and stu-
dents. 4 Cyberbullying is increasingly prevalent in today's schools and 
involves nearly half of U.S. teens. 5 The incidence of cyberbullying is 
higher among females than males and is most rampant among fifteen-
and sixteen-year-olds. 6 While there are multiple definitions of the 
term, cyberbullying is typically described as intentional harm inflicted 
through electronic media. 7 Cyberbullying involves tormenting, threat-
ening, harassing, humiliating, embarrassing or otherwise targeting a 
victim. 8 It is often motivated by prejudice and hate; indeed, some of 
the most serious cases are the result of bias towards the victim's race, 
religion, national origin, gender identity, or sexual orientation.9 
Cyberbullying is a new form of harassment taking place within 
new forms of Internet-based technology. 10 It is instantaneous and its 
reach is potentially unlimited. 11 Anyone can join in with the simple 
4 Jacqueline D. Lipton, Combating Cyber-Victimization, BERKELEY TECH. 
L.J. 1103, 1108 (2011 ). However, it is possible that in any given instance of cyberbul-
lying, at least one of the parties may not be a youth. Id. at 1108-09. 
5 NATIONAL CRIME PREVENTION COUNCIL, supra note 2 (detailing that more 
than four in ten teens, ages thirteen to seventeen, report that they have experienced 
some form of cyberbullying in the last year). See also Bullying/Cyberbullying Preven-
tion Law: Model Statute and Advocacy Toolkit, ANTI-DEFAMATION LEAGUE (Apr. 
2009), http://www.adl.org/civil_rights/Anti-Bullying%20Law%20Toolkit_2009.pdf; 
Interview with Jill Rembrandt, Associate Project Director of the Anti-Defamation 
League in the Ohio, Kentucky and Allegheny Region (Feb. 2011). 
6 NATIONAL CRIME PREVENTION COUNCIL, supra note 2. 
7 Id. 
8 Lipton, supra note 4 at 1109. 
9 ANTI-DEFAMATION LEAGUE, supra, note 5, at 1. This supports the applica-
tion of Title VII because Title VII is intended to protect against discrimination based 
on "race, color, religion, sex, or national origin." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(l) (2011). 
10 According to the Associate Project Director of the Anti-Defamation 
League in the Ohio, Kentucky and Allegheny Region, there are at least thirty-five 
different websites where cyberbullying frequently takes place. Interview with Jill 
Rembrandt, supra note 5. Furthermore, cyberbullying and Internet harassment are 
pervasive threats. See ANTI-DEFAMATION LEAGUE, supra note 5, at 1, 4-5 (noting that 
in a 2007 survey of thirteen- to seventeen-year-olds, thirty-five percent of those sur-
veyed reported being harassed over the internet within the last year). 
11 ANTI-DEFAMATION LEAGUE, supra note 5, at 1. 
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click of a mouse. 12 Messages and pictures on the Internet are poten-
tially more disruptive than messages sent by traditional media because 
the Internet provides for the widespread distribution of information to 
an unlimited audience in a very short amount of time. 13 As a result, 
the impact on the victim can be more severe, and, its effects more 
profound. 
The impact of cyberbullying is well documented. Studies show 
that "difficulty making friends, loneliness, low self-esteem, depres-
sion, poor academic achievement, truancy and suicide are all associat-
ed with being bullied."14 Teenage victims report experiencing a wide 
array of emotions-ranging from anger to embarrassment to fear-as 
a result of cyberbullying. 15 Students need special protection from 
cyberbullying because online abuse quite simply affects children more 
drastically than adults. 16 
Public outcry over cyberbullying skyrocketed in recent years as 
major media outlets broadcasted stories about the tragic suicides of 
teenagers who endured cyberbullying. Take, for example, Tyler 
Clementi, a freshman at Rutgers University. 17 After learning that his 
roommate secretly filmed and broadcasted a video of a sexual encoun-
ter he had with another male student, Tyler posted the following 
12 See, e.g., ANTI-DEFAMATION LEAGUE, supra note 5, at 1 (outlining how 
cyberbullying "can rapidly swell as ... others join in on 'the fun' "); Marlene Sand-
strom, More Insidious Harassment, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 30, 2010, 
http://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2010/091301 cyberbullying-and-a-students-
suicide/more-insidious-harassment (describing the "insidious" nature of cyberbully-
ing); Drew Jackson, How is Cyberbullying Different than Traditional Bullying, 
CYBERBULLYING (Apr. 18, 2005), http://www.slais.ubc.ca/courses/libr500/04-05-
wt2/www/D _Jackson/traditional.htm (describing how a bully can send an email "to 
their entire class or school with a few clicks"). 
13 See Doninger v. Niehoff, 594 F. Supp. 2d 211, 223 (D. Conn. 2009) ("An 
email can be sent to dozens or hundreds of other students by hitting 'send.' A blog 
entry ... can be instantaneously viewed by students, teachers, and administrators 
alike. Off-campus speech can become on-campus speech with the click of a mouse."). 
14 ANTI-DEFAMATION LEAGUE, supra note 5, at 1. See also Lipton, supra 
note 4, at 1104-05 (explaining some instances of online abuse result in severe emo-
tional distress and sometimes physical violence or death). 
15 See NATIONAL CRIME PREVENTION COUNCIL, supra note 2.0ver half of 
cyberbully victims report feeling angry (56%); one-third report feeling hurt (33%); a 
third report being embarrassed (32%), and one in eight said they felt scared (13%). 
16 Lipton, supra note 4, at 1105-06 (discussing how cyberbullying dispropor-
tionately affects disempowered groups). · 
17 Emily Friedman, Victim of Secret Dorm Sex Tape Posts Facebook Good-
bye, Jumps to His Death, ABCNEvvs&p.-.29,20101http://abcnews.go.com/US/victim-
secret-dorm-sex-tape-commits-suicide/story?id= 11758716. 
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statement on his Facebook wall: "Jumping off the gw bridge sorry." 18 
Shortly thereafter, he did. 19 
Or, take the tragic tale of Megan Meier. After creating a Myspace 
account, Megan became online friends with "Josh Evans,"20 a fake 
local sixteen year-old boy created by a classmate and her mother. 21 
Megan and "Josh" quickly established an online relationship, but the 
friendship turned sour about a month later. "Josh" claimed he no 
longer wanted to be friends with Megan after hearing rumors about 
her, and he told Megan that the world would be better off without 
her.22 Soon thereafter, several other students joined in and posted in 
electronic bulletins that "Megan Meir is a slut" and "Megan Meier is 
fat."23 Devastated by the online abuse, Megan wrote that Josh was 
"the kind of boy a girl would kill herself over."24 Megan hung herself 
in her bedroom closet a few hours later. 25 
II. THE TINKER TETRALOGY26 HAS LIMITED 
APPLICATION 
In order to address cyberbullying, it is important to assess what is 
"protected" versus "unprotected" speech under the First Amend-
ment. 27 Categories of unprotected speech include: true threats, 28 
18 Friedman, supra note 17. 
t9 Id. 
20 In reality, there was no Josh Evans. Rather, one of Megan's former friends 
and her mother created the "Josh Evans" profile on Myspace after the friendship 
between the two girls turned sour. Parents: Cyberbullying Led to Teen 's Suicide, 
ABC NEWS: GOOD MORNING AMERICA (Nov. 19, 2007), 
http://abcnews.go.com/GMA/Story?id=3 882520. 
21 ABC NEWS: GOOD MORNING AMERICA, supra note 20; see also Gordon 
Tokumatsu & Jonathan Lloyd, MySpace Case: "You 're the Kind of Boy a Girl Would 
Kill Herself Over,", NBCBAY AREA(Jan. 26, 2009), 
http://www.nbcbayarea.com/news/local/W oman-Testifies-About-Final-Message-
Sent-to-Teen.html. 
22 Tokumatsu, supra note 21. 
23 ABC NEWS: GOOD MORNING AMERICA, supra note 20. 
24 Tokumatsu, supra note 21. 
25 Id. 
26 The Tinker Tetralogy refers to four U.S. Supreme Court cases, beginning 
with Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969). Three addi-
tional U.S. Supreme Court cases complete the Tinker tetralogy. Morse v. Frederick, 
551 U.S. 393 (2007); Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260 (1988); Beth-
el Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675 (1986). See Benjamin L. Ellison, More 
Connection, Less Protection? Off-Campus Speech with On-Campus Impact, 85 
NOTRE DAMEL. REV. 809, 819 n.67 (2010) ("With the addition of Morse, the Tinker 
trilogy becomes a tetralogy, from the Greek prefix tetra- meaning 'four."') 
27 The First Amendment states, in part, "Congress shall make no law ... 
abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press." U.S. Const. amend. I. 
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fighting words,29 incitement,30 and obscenity.31 Courts further label 
some speech as unprotected because they consider it "without value, 
not advancing political discussion, unnecessary in form to communi-
cate ideas, or a combination of these."32 Schools may punish on-
campus speech falling into these unprotected categories, and in addi-
tion, may even restrict speech that goes beyond these categories. 33 
U.S. Supreme Court precedent over the past 40 years establishes 
that public school students retain the First Amendment right to free 
speech while at school.34 That right, however, is more limited than 
speech rights in a public forum because schools retain an interest in 
maintaining an orderly and productive learning environment. 35 Rather, 
"[t]he constitutional rights of students in public schools are not auto-
matically coextensive with the rights of adults in other settings."36 
28 NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 916 (1982)("The first 
amendment does not protect violence."); Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705, 707 
(1969) (per curiam) (noting that true threats are not constitutionally protected speech). 
29 Chaplinskyv. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 573-74 (1942)(classifying 
speech directed at another and likely to provoke a violent response as unprotected). 
30 Brandenburgv. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969) (per curiam) (classifying 
speech that incites imminent lawless action as unprotected). 
31 Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 485 (1957) (stating that "obscenity is 
not within the area of constitutionally protected speech"). 
32 Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 572 (articulating that some speech is "clearly 
outweighed by the social interest in order and morality"). 
33 Ellison, supra note 26, at 812 (The Tinker Tetralogy "establish[ es] that a 
student's constitutional right to freedom of expression gives way to the school's inter-
ests in education, order, and discipline ifthe expression is substantially disruptive, 
plainly offensive, perceived to be school sponsored expression, or understood to 
advocate illegal drug use."). 
34 See, e.g., J.S. ex rel. Snyder v. Blue Mountain Sch. Dist., 650 F.3d 915, 
926 (3d Cir. 2011) (en bane), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 1097 (2012). 
35 Conditions in the school environment potentially justify constraining stu-
dent speech since: 
[S]tudents and teachers cannot easily disassociate themselves from expressions di-
rected towards them on school property and during school hours, because disciplinary 
problems in such a populated and concentrated setting seriously sap the educational 
processes, and because high school teachers and administrators have the vital respon-
sibility of compressing a variety of subjects and activities into a relatively confined 
period of time and space .... 
Shanleyv. Ne. Indep. Sch. Dist., 462 F.2d 960, 968-69 (5th Cir. 1972). See also 
Tinkerv. Des Moines lndep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 512-13 (1969); 
Layshock, 496 F. Supp. 2d at 595. Such discussion provides further support of the 
position adopted in this Note, such that schools have the duty to step in and limit 
speech when it creates a hostile learning environment. 
36 Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 396-97 (2007) (quoting Bethel School 
Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 682 (1986)). See also Morse, 551 U.S. at 406 
(quoting Vernonia Sch. Dist. 471 v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 655-56 (1995)) ( "[T] he 
nature of those rights is what is appropriate for children in school."). See also New 
Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 340 (1985) ("It is evident that the school setting re-
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Students' rights must be analyzed "in light of the special characteris-
tics of the school environment. "37 As a result, student speech rights 
under the First Amendment have developed separately from the more 
general First Amendment free-speech jurisprudence. 38 Tinker is the 
Supreme Court's first attempt to define students' free speech rights in 
schools. Tinker and three subsequent student speech cases, collective-
ly known as the Tinker tetralogy, address instances involving stu-
dents' free speech rights. 
A. The Starting Line: The Tinker Standard 
Tinker dealt with a small group of high school and middle school 
students who wore black armbands to school to protest the Vietnam 
War. The school issued a warning that students wearing armbands on 
school grounds would face suspension. 39 Several students wore arm-
. bands anyway and the school suspended them in accordance with 
school policy. 40 The students subsequently brought a civil action 
against the school for infringing on their First Amendment rights. 41 
The district court upheld the school sanction as reasonable in order to 
ensure school discipline. 42 The Eighth Circuit-hearing the case en 
bane-was evenly divided, so the lower court's decision was affirmed 
without opinion. 43 The Supreme Court accepted certiorari. 44 
The Supreme Court began its opinion by famously stating: "It can 
hardly be argued that either students or teachers shed their constitu-
tional rights to freedom of speech or expression at the schoolhouse 
gate. "45 Yet, "the Court has repeatedly emphasized the need for af-
firming the comprehensive authority of the States and of school offi-
cials, consistent with fundamental constitutional safeguards, to pre-
scribe and control conduct in the schools."46 
quires some easing of the restrictions to which searches by public authorities are 
ordinarily subject."); Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 656 ("Fourth Amendment rights, no less 
than First and Fourteenth Amendment rights, are different in public schools than 
elsewhere .... "). 
37 Morse, 551 U.S. at 397 (quoting Tinker, 393 U.S. at 506). 
38 See infra notes 39-89 and accompanying text. 
39 Tinker v. Des Moines lndep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 504 (1969). 
4o Id. 
41 Id. 
42 Id. at 504-05. 
43 Id.at 505. 
44 Id. 
45 Id. at 506. 
46 Id. at 507 
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fighting words,29 incitement,30 and obscenity.31 Courts further label 
some speech as unprotected because they consider it "without value, 
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matically coextensive with the rights of adults in other settings."36 
28 NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 916 (1982)("The first 
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34 See, e.g., J.S. ex rel. Snyder v. Blue Mountain Sch. Dist., 650 F.3d 915, 
926 (3d Cir. 2011) (en bane), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 1097 (2012). 
35 Conditions in the school environment potentially justify constraining stu-
dent speech since: 
[S]tudents and teachers cannot easily disassociate themselves from expressions di-
rected towards them on school property and during school hours, because disciplinary 
problems in such a populated and concentrated setting seriously sap the educational 
processes, and because high school teachers and administrators have the vital respon-
sibility of compressing a variety of subjects and activities into a relatively confined 
period of time and space .... 
Shanley v. Ne. Indep. Sch. Dist., 462 F.2d 960, 968-69 (5th Cir. 1972). See also 
Tinkerv. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 512-13 (1969); 
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36 Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 396-97 (2007) (quoting Bethel School 
Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 682 (1986)). See also Morse, 551 U.S. at 406 
(quoting Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47Jv. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 655-56 (1995)) ( "[T] he 
nature of those rights is what is appropriate for children in school."). See also New 
Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 340 (1985) ("It is evident that the school setting re-
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without opinion. 43 The Supreme Court accepted certiorari. 44 
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than First and Fourteenth Amendment rights, are different in public schools than 
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39 Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 504 (1969). 
40 Id. 
41 Id. 
42 Id. at 504-05. 
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45 Id. at 506. 
46 Id. at 507 
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Thus, the Court observed that in order to limit a student's expres-
sion, the State 47 must show that the prohibition of a particular expres-
sion was caused by something more than the desire to avoid the dis-
comfort associated with an unpopular viewpoint. 48 The Court did not 
find that students wearing armbands would "materially and substan-
tially interfere with the requirements of appropriate discipline in the 
operation of the school,"49 nor did the Court find that there was any 
reasonable forecast of such disturbance. 50 Accordingly, the school's 
disciplinary actions violated the students' First Amendment rights. 51 
B. The Tinker Tetralogy & the Narrowing Scope of Protected 
Student Speech 
While Tinker purportedly offered broad protection of student free 
speech rights by requiring a material and substantial disruption before 
school interference was justified, the Supreme Court considerably 
narrowed that protection in three subsequent cases. The three land-
mark cases did not overrule Tinker, but they explained that a school 
has the authority to limit student speech beyond the substantial inter-
ference criteria set forth in Tinker. In Bethel School District No. 403 v. 
Fraser, 52 Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier,53 and Morse v. 
Frederick, 54 the Supreme Court examined when speech constitutes a 
substantial disruption and when controversial speech occurs under the 
auspices of a school-sponsored activity. 
1. Fraser: No Protection for Crude Speech 
In 1983, Bethel School District suspended Matthew Fraser before 
his high school graduation because he used several graphic sexual 
comments and metaphors in a speech nominating a classmate for a 
student-elected office at a school assembly. 55 Fraser was disciplined 
47 The "State" being referred to by the Court is the "State in the person of 
school officials." Id. at 509. 
48 Id. at 509. 
49 Id. (quoting Burnside v. Byars, 363 F.2d 744, 749 (5th Cir. 1966)). 
50 Id. at 514. 
51 
"In the absence of a specific showing of constitutionality valid reasons to 
regulate their speech, students are entitled to freedom of expression of their views." 
Tinker, 393 U.S. at 511. 
52 478 U.S. 675 (1986) 
53 484 U.S. 260 (1987) 
54 551 U.S. 393 (2007). 
55 
Fraser's entire speech was: 
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for violating a school rule prohibiting "[ c ]onduct which materially and 
substantially interferes with the educational process . . . including the 
use of obscene, profane language or gestures."56 Deferring to school 
officials, the Court upheld Fraser's sanction. The Court explained that 
the school remains a place where order, discipline, and inculcation of 
values must be maintained. 57 
The Supreme Court noted that many students, especially girls and 
younger listeners, were likely shocked and offended by the speech. 58 
The Court proclaimed that "schools, as instruments of the state, may 
determine that the essential lessons of civil, mature conduct cannot be 
conveyed in a school that tolerates lewd, indecent, or offensive speech 
and conduct .... "59 
Under Fraser, schools have broader rights to determine what is 
appropriate behavior and speech. 60 Subsequent rulings make clear that 
the holding in Fraser relied on a different mode of analysis than Tink-
er. 
61 Fraser did not rely on the substantial disruption test prescribed 
by Tinker; rather, the decision in Fraser rested on the "vulgar," 
I know a man who is firm--he's firm in his pants, he's firm in his shirt, his character is 
firm--but most ... of all, his belief in you, the students of Bethel, is firm. Jeff 
Kuhlman is a man who takes his point and pounds it in. If necessary, he'll take an 
issue and nail it to the wall. He doesn't attack things in spurts--he drives hard, push-
ing and pushing until finally--he succeeds. Jeff is a man who will go to the very end--
even the climax, for each and every one of you. So vote for Jeff for A.S.B. vice-
president--he'll never come between you and the best our high school can be. 
Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 677-78 (1986). 
56 Id. at 678. 
57 Id. at 681 ("[Public] education must prepare pupils for citizenship in the 
Republic .... It must inculcate the habits and manners of civility as values in them-
selves conducive to happiness and as indispensable to the practice of self-government 
in the community and the nation.") (alteration in original) (quoting C. BEARD & M. 
BEARD, NEW BASIC HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES 228 (1968)). 
58 Id. at 683-84 ("The speech could well be seriously damaging to its less 
mature audience, many of whom were only 14 years old and on the threshold of 
awareness of human sexuality."). 
59 Id. at 683. 
60 Id. at 682 ("[T]he constitutional rights of students in public school are not 
automatically coextensive with the rights of adults in other settings.") (citing New 
Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 340-42 (1985). Years later, the Morse Court explained 
that Fraser's First Amendment rights were circumscribed "in light of the special char-
acteristics of the school environment." Morse v. Frederick 551 U.S. 393, 405 (2007) 
(quoting Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969)). 
61 Morse, 551 U.S. at 405 ("Fraser established that Tinker's analysis is not 
absolute. Whatever approach Fraser employed, it was not the 'substantial disruption' 
analysis prescribed by Tinker."). 
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for violating a school rule prohibiting "[ c ]onduct which materially and 
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use of obscene, profane language or gestures."56 Deferring to school 
officials, the Court upheld Fraser's sanction. The Court explained that 
the school remains a place where order, discipline, and inculcation of 
values must be maintained. 57 
The Supreme Court noted that many students, especially girls and 
younger listeners, were likely shocked and offended by the speech. 58 
The Court proclaimed that "schools, as instruments of the state, may 
determine that the essential lessons of civil, mature conduct cannot be 
conveyed in a school that tolerates lewd, indecent, or offensive speech 
and conduct .... "59 
Under Fraser, schools have. broader rights to determine what is 
appropriate behavior and speech. 60 Subsequent rulings make clear that 
the holding in Fraser relied on a different mode of analysis than Tink-
er. 
61 Fraser did not rely on the substantial disruption test prescribed 
by Tinker; rather, the decision in Fraser rested on the "vulgar," 
I know a man who is firm--he's firm in his pants, he's firm in his shirt, his character is 
firm--but most ... of all, his belief in you, the students of Bethel, is firm. Jeff 
Kuhlman is a man who takes his point and pounds it in. If necessary, he'll take an 
issue and nail it to the wall. He doesn't attack things in spurts--he drives hard, push-
ing and pushing until finally--he succeeds. Jeff is a man who will go to the very end--
even the climax, for each and every one of you. So vote for Jeff for A.S.B. vice-
president--he'll never come between you and the best our high school can be. 
Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 677-78 (1986). 
56 Id. at 678. 
57 Id. at 681 ("[Public] education must prepare pupils for citizenship in the 
Republic .... It must inculcate the habits and manners of civility as values in them-
selves conducive to happiness and as indispensable to the practice of self-government 
in the community and the nation.") (alteration in original) (quoting C. BEARD & M. 
BEARD, NEW BASIC HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES 228 (1968)). 
58 Id. at 683-84 ("The speech could well be seriously damaging to its less 
mature audience, many of whom were only 14 years old and on the threshold of 
awareness of human sexuality."). 
59 Id. at 683. 
60 Id. at 682 ("[T]he constitutional rights of students in public school are not 
automatically coextensive with the rights of adults in other settings.") (citing New 
Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 340-42 (1985). Years later, the Morse Court explained 
that Fraser's First Amendment rights were circumscribed "in light of the special char-
acteristics of the school environment." Morse v. Frederick 551 U.S. 393, 405 (2007) 
(quoting Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969)). 
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"lewd," and "plainly offensive" character of the speech and its nega-
tive impact on school's educational environment. 62 
2. Hazelwood: Control Over Pedagogical Concerns 
In Hazelwood, students involved in a high school journalism class 
filed suit alleging violation of their freedom of speech rights after 
their school principal did not allow publication of articles dealing with 
divorce and teen pregnancy in the school newspaper. 63 The principal 
asserted that the material was inappropriate for younger students and 
compromised students' privacy, even though the articles used ficti-
tious names. 64 Relying on the test from Tinker, the court of appeals 
found no evidence of a material disruption to class work or school 
discipline. 65 Subsequently, the Supreme Court reversed, holding that 
schools have broad discretion to limit student speech in school-
d . . . 66 sponsore act1v1tles. 
The Court noted that the school exercised a significant amount of 
control over its student newspapers and therefore concluded that the 
newspaper was part of the school's curriculum. 67 The students were 
under the supervision of a teacher and the paper was funded entirely 
by the school. 68 The Supreme Court upheld the school's actions be-
cause "educators do not offend the First Amendment by exercising 
editorial control over the style and content of student speech in 
school-sponsored activities as long as their actions are reasonably 
related to legitimate pedagogical concems."69 
3. Morse: No Protection for Speech Related to Illegal 
Drug Use 
Prior to the 2002 Olympics in Salt Lake City, Utah, a high school 
student, Joseph Frederick, displayed a fourteen-foot banner proclaim-
ing "BONG HiTS 4 JESUS" across the street from his high school 
62 Fraser, 478 U.S. at 683-84. See also Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 
484 U.S. 260, 271 n.4 (1988). 
63 Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 262-63 (1988). 
64 Id. at 263. The article dealing with pregnancy discussed sexual activities 
and birth control, whereas the article dealing with divorce contained sensitive details 
of the subject student's home life. Id. 
65 Kuhlmeier v. Hazelwood School Dist., 795 F.2d 1368, 1375 (1986), rev'd, 
484 U.S. 260 (1988). 
66 Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 266 (1988). 
67 Id. at 263, 268. 
68 Id. 
69 Id. at 273. 
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during the Olympic Torch Relay that passed through his hometown in 
Alaska. 7° Frederick's principal was concerned that bystanders might 
interpret the banner as advocating illegal drug use, so he confiscated 
the banner and suspended Frederick. 71 
Although the students were gathered off-campus and across the 
street from the school, the Court considered the rally a school-
sponsored event because school officials were interspersed among the 
students and monitored the students at the rally. 72 To buttress the 
holding, the Court cited statistical evidence about the serious drug 
problem among the Nation's youth. 73 Accordingly, the Court con-
cluded that schools may take steps to "safeguard those entrusted to 
their care from speech that can reasonably be regarded as encouraging 
illegal drug use."74 Thus, the school did not violate Frederick's consti-
tutional rights because schools have an acute interest in deterring stu-
dent drug use. 75 
One frustrating aspect of the Tinker tetralogy is that the Court has 
not yet provided a workable test for determining the extent of a 
school's authority over off-campus student speech. 76 Even so, the 
Morse decision dealing with off-campus speech provides the closest 
indication of how the Court might analyze cyber speech, which simi-
larly occurs off-campus. 77 
C. The Limitations of the Tinker Tetralogy 
The Tinker tetralogy sets forth a number of factors to consider 
when analyzing whether a school can restrict student speech. The 
70 Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 396-97 (2007). 
71 Id. at 398. 
72 Id. at 400-01. Additionally, the rally took place during school hours, the 
school band and cheerleaders performed, and Frederick's banner was oriented so 
students could view it. Id. at 401. 
73 Id. at 408 ( "Drug abuse can cause severe and permanent damage to the 
health and well-being of young people .... The problem remains serious today. 
About half of American 12th graders have used an illicit drug, as have more than a 
third of 10th graders and about one-fifth of 8th graders .... Some 25% of high 
schoolers say they have been offered, sold, or given an illegal drug on school property 
within the past year.") (citations omitted). 
74 Id.at 397. 
75 Id. at 397. 
76 Id. at 401. 
77 See Morse, 551U.S.·393. The Court did not decide this issue in Morse, 
and subsequently declined to clarify the issue. Blue Mountain Sch. Dist. v. J.S., 132 
S. Ct. 1097 (2012) (denying certiorari); Kowalski v. Berkeley Cnty. Sch., 132 S. Ct. 
1095 (2012) (denying certiorari); Wisniewski v. Bd. ofEduc., 128 S. Ct. 1741 (2008) 
(denying certiorari). 
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general framework provided by the Tinker tetralogy considers whether 
the speech: a) poses a substantial disruption; 78 b) is lewd or offensive 
to the young audience in the school setting; 79 c) takes place during a 
school-sponsored activity or is connected to a pedagogical purpose;80 
or d) promotes negative behavior such as illegal drug use. 81 The ap-
plication of these factors has led to some inconsistencies among lower 
courts analyzing student cyber-speech cases. 82 Indeed, in Morse, Jus-
tice Breyer described the lack of clear guidance given to courts about 
the regulation of student speech: 
In some instances, it is appropriate to decide a constitutional 
issue in order to provide "guidance" for the future. But I 
cannot find much guidance in today's decision .... Beyond 
"steps" that prohibit the unfurling of banners at school out-
ings, the Court does not explain just what those "re-
strict[ions ]" or those "steps" might be. 83 
Justice Thomas also warned about such ambiguity in the Court's 
·present view on student speech: 
[W]e continue to distance ourselves from Tinker, but"we nei-
ther overrule it nor offer an explanation of when it operates 
78 See Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969). 
79 See Bethel School Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675 (1986). 
80 See Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlrneier, 484 U.S. 260, 273 (1988). 
81 See Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 397 (2007). 
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to off-campus speech "and that the First Amendment protects students engaging in 
off-campus speech to the same extent it protects speech by citizens in the community 
at large."); Layshock ex rel. Layshock v. Hermitage Sch. Dist., 593 F.3d 249, 258 (3d 
Cir. 2010) (adopting a multi-factored "nexus test" requiring the school to demonstrate 
a sufficient nexus between the student's speech and a substantial disruption of the 
school environment); Pinard v. Clatskanie Sch. Dist. 6J, 467 F.3d 755, 765 (9th Cir. 
2006) ("[There are] three categories of speech that school officials may constitution-
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Dist., 711 F. Supp. 2d 1094, 1119-21 (C.D. Cal. 2010) (using a hybrid test examining 
whether there was a reasonably foreseeable risk of future substantial disruption). 
83 Morse, 551 U.S. at 428 (Breyer, J., concurring in part and dissenting in 
part) (alteration in original). 
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and when it does not. I am afraid that our jurisprudence now 
says that students have a right to speak in schools except 
when they do not-a standard continuously developed 
through litigation against local schools and their administra-
tors. 84 
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Providing even greater uncertainty is the fact that cyberbullying 
presents a new category of "cyber speech" that takes place in a forum 
never fully addressed by the Supreme Court. 85 Indeed, it is not even 
clear whether speech existing in cyber space may be considered 
speech within the schoolhouse gates since that determination remains 
subject to a highly fact-based analysis. 86 Many circuit courts directly 
apply the Tinker substantial disruption test without considering 
whether the speech took place on or off campus. 87 The Third Circuit 
explained, "we hold that off-campus speech that causes or reasonably 
threatens to cause a substantial disruption . . . with a school need not 
satisfy any geographical technicality in order to be regulated pursuant 
to Tinker." 88 Yet some circuit courts, primarily the Second Circuit, 
have considered the location of the speech as an important threshold 
issue that courts must resolve before applying any student speech 
analysis derived from Supreme Court precedent. 89 
84 Id. at 418-19 (Thomas, J., concurring). 
85 See, e.g., Beverly Hills Unified Sch. Dist., 711 F. Supp. 2d at 1102-03 
("The Supreme Court has yet to address the factual situation at hand-whether a 
school can regulate student speech or expression that occurs outside the school gates, 
and is not connected to a school-sponsored event, but that subsequently makes its 
ways onto campus, either by the speaker or by other means."). 
86 See e.g., J.S. v. Bethlehem Area Sch. Dist., 807 A.2d 847, 865, 869 (Pa. 
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tween the website and the school campus to warrant application of the substantial 
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informed other students about it. Moreover, school officials were the subject of the 
website.). 
87 La Vine v. Blaine Sch. Dist., 257 F.3d 981, 983, 992 (9th Cir. 2000) (ap-
plying the substantial disruption test to a violent poem written at home and brought 
into school, without regard to the location where the speech originated); Shanley v. 
Ne. Indep. Sch. Dist., 462 F.2d 960, 964, 970 (5th Cir. 1972) (applying Tinker where 
student-created underground newspapers were created and distributed entirely off-
campus but turned up on campus). See also Boucher v. Sch. Bd., 134 F.3d 821, 827-
28 (7th Cir. 1998) (analyzing an underground newspaper distributed at school). 
88 J.S. ex rel. Snyder v. Blue Mountain Sch. Dist., 593 F.3d 286, 301 (3d Cir. 
2010). 
89 See e.g., Doninger v. Niehoff, 527 F .3d 41, 50 (2d. Cir. 2008) (A student, 
A very, sent an email to students and parents and posted a message on her personal 
blog criticizing the school for cancelling a school event and encouraging recipients to 
274 JOURNAL OF LAW, TECHNOLOGY & THE INTERNET [Vol. 3:2] 
general framework provided by the Tinker tetralogy considers whether 
the speech: a) poses a substantial disruption; 78 b) is lewd or offensive 
to the young audience in the school setting; 79 c) takes place during a 
school-sponsored activity or is connected to a pedagogical purpose;80 
or d) promotes negative behavior such as illegal drug use. 81 The ap-
plication of these factors has led to some inconsistencies among lower 
courts analyzing student cyber-speech cases. 82 Indeed, in Morse, Jus-
tice Breyer described the lack of clear guidance given to courts about 
the regulation of student speech: 
In some instances, it is appropriate to decide a constitutional 
issue in order to provide "guidance" for the future. But I 
cannot find much guidance in today's decision .... Beyond 
"steps" that prohibit the unfurling of banners at school out-
ings, the Court does not explain just what those "re-
strict[ions ]" or those "steps" might be. 83 
Justice Thomas also warned about such ambiguity in the Court's 
·present view on student speech: 
[W]e continue to distance ourselves from Tinker, bufwe nei-
ther overrule it nor offer an explanation of when it operates 
78 See Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969). 
79 See Bethel School Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675 (1986). 
80 See Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 273 (1988). 
81 See Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 397 (2007). 
82 See generally J.S. ex rel. Snyder v. Blue Mountain Sch. Dist., 650 F.3d 
915, 936 (3d Cir. 2011) (Smith, J., concurring) (advocating that Tinker does not apply 
to off-campus speech "and that the First Amendment protects students engaging in 
off-campus speech to the same extent it protects speech by citizens in the community 
at large."); Layshock ex rel. Layshock v. Hermitage Sch. Dist., 593 F.3d 249, 258 (3d 
Cir. 2010) (adopting a multi-factored "nexus test" requiring the school to demonstrate 
a sufficient nexus between the student's speech and a substantial disruption of the 
school environment); Pinard v. Clatskanie Sch. Dist. 6J, 467 F.3d 755, 765 (9th Cir. 
2006) ("[There are] three categories of speech that school officials may constitution-
ally regulate, each of which is governed by different Supreme Court precedent: (1) 
vulgar, lewd, obscene and plainly offensive speech is governed by [Fraser]; (2) 
school-sponsored speech is governed by Hazelwood; and (3) speech that falls into 
neither of these categories is governed by Tinker."); La Vine v. Blaine Sch. Dist., 257 
F.3d 981, 988-89 (9th Cir. 2001) (same); Thomas v. Bd. ofEduc., 607 F.2d 1043, 
1050 (2d Cir. 1979) (finding Tinker and it's progeny inapplicable because "all but an 
insignificant amount of relevant activity in this case was deliberately designed to take 
place beyond the schoolhouse gate."); J.C. ex rel. R.C. v. Beverly Hills Unified Sch. 
Dist., 711 F. Supp. 2d 1094, 1119-21 (C.D. Cal. 2010) (using a hybrid test examining 
whether there was a reasonably foreseeable risk of future substantial disruption). 
83 Morse, 551 U.S. at 428 (Breyer, J., concurring in part and dissenting in 
part) (alteration in original). 
HOSTILE LEARNING ENVIRONMENT 
and when it does not. I am afraid that our jurisprudence now 
says that students have a right to speak in schools except 
when they do not-a standard continuously developed 
through litigation against local schools and their administra-
tors. 84 
275 
Providing even greater uncertainty is the fact that cyberbullying 
presents a new category of "cyber speech" that takes place in a forum 
never fully addressed by the Supreme Court. 85 Indeed, it is not even 
clear whether speech existing in cyber space may be considered 
speech within the schoolhouse gates since that determination remains 
subject to a highly fact-based analysis. 86 Many circuit courts directly 
apply the Tinker substantial disruption test without considering 
whether the speech took place on or off campus. 87 The Third Circuit 
explained, "we hold that off-campus speech that causes or reasonably 
threatens to cause a substantial disruption . . . with a school need not 
satisfy any geographical technicality in order to be regulated pursuant 
to Tinker. "88 Yet some circuit courts, primarily the Second Circuit, 
have considered the location of the speech as an important threshold 
issue that courts must resolve before applying any student speech 
analysis derived from Supreme Court precedent. 89 
84 Id. at 418-19 (Thomas, J., concurring). 
85 See, e.g., Beverly Hills Unified Sch. Dist., 711 F. Supp. 2d at 1102-03 
("The Supreme Court has yet to address the factual situation at hand-whether a 
school can regulate student speech or expression that occurs outside the school gates, 
and is not connected to a school-sponsored event, but that subsequently makes its 
ways onto campus, either by the speaker or by other means."). 
86 See e.g., J.S. v. Bethlehem Area Sch. Dist., 807 A.2d 847, 865, 869 (Pa. 
2002) (The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania analyzed whether a student's website-
which was allegedly violent and derogatory about school officials-was on-campus 
or off-campus speech. The court concluded that there was a "sufficient nexus" be-
tween the website and the school campus to warrant application of the substantial 
disruption test from Tinker because J.S. had accessed the website during class and 
informed other students about it. Moreover, school officials were the subject of the 
website.). 
87 La Vine v. Blaine Sch. Dist., 257 F.3d 981, 983, 992 (9th Cir. 2000) (ap-
plying the substantial disruption test to a violent poem written at home and brought 
into school, without regard to the location where the speech originated); Shanley v. 
Ne. Indep. Sch. Dist., 462 F.2d 960, 964, 970 (5th Cir. 1972) (applying Tinker where 
student-created underground newspapers were created and distributed entirely off-
campus but turned up on campus). See also Boucher v. Sch. Bd., 134 F.3d 821, 827-
28 (7th Cir. 1998) (analyzing an underground newspaper distributed at school). 
88 J.S. ex rel. Snyder v. Blue Mountain Sch. Dist., 593 F.3d 286, 301 (3d Cir. 
2010). 
89 See e.g., Doninger v. Niehoff, 527 F.3d 41, 50 (2d. Cir. 2008) (A student, 
A very, sent an email to students and parents and posted a message on her personal 
blog criticizing the school for cancelling a school event and encouraging recipients to 
276 JOURNAL OF LAW, TECHNOLOGY & THE INTERNET [Vol. 3:2] 
Cyberbullying presents a host of modem challenges that have not 
yet been raised in the student speech cases considered by the Supreme 
Court. Cyberbullying is harassment directed at a particular victim 
rather than expression of a political belief. Cyberbullying does not 
involve generalized sexual innuendos, school newspaper articles about 
fictitious people, or a vague statement alluding to illegal drug use. 
Cyberbullying does not typically take place on school grounds or dur-
ing school-sponsored activities. Rather, cyber speech occurs over 
email, on a student's Facebook wall, in a "tweet," and in countless 
electronic bulletin boards and chat rooms. Courts must modernize the 
Tinker tetralogy' s method of analysis to deal with the very real prob-
lem that cyber speech poses to schools today. As discussed below, 
courts need additional interpretative tools to address the unique cate-
gory of cyber speech. 
ID. THE NEED FOR A NEW TEST: CYBERBULL YING 
REQUIRES PROTECTION OF STUDENT VICTIMS 
A. Cyberbullying is Targeted Abuse 
Cyberbullying is verbal assault. It is directed at specific, identifia-
ble victims. A school's decision to prohibit speech that rises to the 
level of cyberbullying is, as Tinker requires, "caused by something 
more than a mere desire to avoid discomfort ... [associated with] an 
unpopular viewpoint."90 It is caused by the desire to protect victims 
from harassment and humiliation, 91 thereby promoting a productive 
learning environment. 
In order to effectively address cyberbullying in schools, courts 
and school officials need to shift their focus away from looking solely 
for a material and substantial interference within the operation of the 
school. Instead, the focus should be on identifying a material and sub-
stantial interference in the educational environment of the targeted 
victim. The school's main goal in addressing cyberbullying should be 
protecting the victim. If the school successfully protects students from 
contact school officials. The Court explained it was reasonably foreseeable that 
A very' s message would reach the school campus because the message was designed 
to reach campus by encouraging readers to contact the school). See also Wisniewski 
v. Weedsport Cent. Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 494 F.3d 34, 39-40 (2d Cir. 2007) (con-
sidering the nexus between a student's AOL Instant Messaging and the school's cam-
pus and holding that it must be shown that it was reasonably foreseeable that a violent 
icon contained within an Instant Message would reach the school property). 
90 Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 509 (1969). 
91 See supra notes 4-25 and accompanying text (highlighting the possible bad 
results of unchecked cyberbullying). 
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cyberbullying, the educational environment should, in tum, improve 
for all students. 
In order to effectively quarantine cyberbullying, any proposed test 
must promote a reasonably expedient process for determining when 
school intervention is justified. This Note's proposed test diverges 
from the Tinker tetralogy' s focus on disruption to the school as a 
whole and instead focuses on the individual victim's learning envi-
ronment. This new approach incentivizes school officials into take 
prompt, corrective action, rather than sitting idly by as cyberbullying 
continues to escalate. 
Because this proposed test focuses on the victim's individual 
learning environment, Title VII' s hostile working environment stand-
ard, which also focuses on the individual, provides an apt analogy 
and, thus, a useful starting point. As explained below, the hostile work 
environment analysis translates well into this Note's proposed hostile 
learning environment test. 
B. Children Need More Protection than Adults. 
A child should be protected from a hostile learning environment, 
just as adults are protected from hostile working environments. Be-
cause children are more vulnerable and susceptible to online harass-
ment than adults, this Note argues that a child's learning environment 
deserves greater protection than an adult's working environment. This 
is not a novel idea. Minors have traditionally received more protection 
on the Internet than adults. In recent years, Congress passed legisla-
tion protecting children from various online threats, including the 
Children's Online Privacy Protection Act ("COPPA")92 and the Inter-
net Safety Act contained in Title VII of the Adam Walsh Child Pro-
tection and Safety Act of 2006. 93 
Cyberbullying poses greater risks for minors than adults. Studies 
have found that one-third to one-half of adolescents struggle with low 
self-esteem, especially in early adolescence.94 Additionally, "the aver-
92 Children's Online Privacy Protection Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 6501-6506 (2000) 
(protecting online personal information from children under thirteen years of age 
collected or stored by persons or entities under U.S. jurisdiction). 
93 Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act of2006, Pub. L. No. 109-
248, 120 Stat. 587 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 18 & 42 U.S.C.) 
(protecting children from sexual predators on the Internet, child exploitation online, 
and words or images harmful to children on the Internet). 
94 Act for Youth Upstate Center of Excellence: Cornell University, Universi-
ty of Rochester & New York State Center for School Safety, Research Facts and 
Findings: Adolescent Self-Esteem (June 2003), 
http://www.actforyouth.net/resources/rf/rf _ slfestm _ 0603 .pdf. 
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Findings: Adolescent Self-Esteem (June 2003), 
http://www.actforyouth.net/resources/rf/rf_ slfestm _ 0603 .pdf. 
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age adolescent is less responsible [during decision-making], more 
myopic, and less temperate than the average adult."95 "Children and 
adolescents often desperately seek the affirmation and approval by 
their peers," and they commonly experience "emotional, psychologi-
cal, and behavioral ill effects" when they perceive themselves to be 
socially rejected. 96 Cyberbullying is anecdotally and empirically 
linked to maladaptive emotional, psychological, developmental, and 
behavioral consequences, including delinquency and school vio-
lence. 97 
C. The Current Law is Failing Our Youth 
In response to this new form of bullying and its potentially drastic 
consequences, roughly 30 states have included electronic forms of 
harassment in their anti-bullying statutes. 98 In 2008, the House of 
Representatives introduced the Megan Meier Cyber Bullying Preven-
tion Act,99 but the proposed federal legislation failed to pass because 
its language 100 was unclear and overly broad. IOI Twenty states have 
95 Elizabeth Cauffman & Laurence Steinberg, (Im)maturity of Judgment in 
Adolescence: Why Adolescents may be less Culpable than Adults, 18 BEHAV. Sci. & 
L., 741, 757 (2000). 
96 Sameer Hinduja & Justin W. Patchin, Offiine Consequences of Online 
Victimization: School Violence and Delinquency, 6(3) J. SCH. VIOLENCE 89, 95 
(2007). 
97 Id. at 103, 108 (After compiling data from over 1,300 Internet-using ado-
lescents, the authors noted "the emotional and psychological costs of cyberbullying 
victimization and empirically linked cyberbullying victimization with oftline delin-
quent and deviant behavior"). 
98 Sameer Hinduja & Justin W. Patchin, State Cyberbullying Laws: A Brief 
Review of State Cyberbullying Laws and Policies, CYBERBULLYING RESEARCH 
CENTER (July 2010), 
http://www.cyberbullying.us/Bullying_ and_ Cyberbullying_ Laws _20100701.pdf; see 
also BULLY POLICE USA, http://www.bullypolice.org/ (last updated Jan. 2012). 
99 Megan Meier Cyberbullying Prevention Act, H.R. 6123, 1 lOth Cong. (2d 
Sess. 2008). The Act was ultimately referred to the House Subcommittee on Crime, 
Terrorism, and Homeland Security on July 28, 2008, where it remains. Bill Summary 
& Status: llOth Congress (2007 - 2008), HR.6123, LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, 
http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?dl lO:h.r.06123: (last visited Feb. 29, 2012). 
100 
"Whoever transmits in interstate or foreign commerce any communication, 
with the intent to coerce, intimidate, harass, or cause substantial emotional distress to 
a person, using electronic means to support severe, repeated, and hostile behavior, 
shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than two years, or both." H.R. 
6123 § 3. 
101 See Steven Kotler, Cyberbullying Bill Could Ensnare Free Speech Rights, 
FoxNEWS.COM (May 14, 2009), 
http ://www.foxnews.com/politics/2009 /05/14/ cyberbullying-ensnare-free-speech-
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enacted statutes containing provisions that require school districts to 
adopt anti-cyberbullying policies. I02 However, many of these statutes 
"do not adequately guide schools regarding when they have jurisdic-
tion over students' online activity." 103 In order to effectively address 
cyberbullying in schools, school officials need clarity on the bounda-
ries of their authority over cyber speech occurring off school grounds. 
IV. DEVELOPING A TEST FROM AN EXCELLENT 
STARTING POINT: TITLE VII AND TITLE IX 
A. Title VII: Hostile Work Environment Translates into Hos-
tile School Environment 
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 covers discrimination by 
an employer against "any individual with respect to his [or her] com-
pensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment because of 
such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin."104 Hos-
tile work environment law was initially developed under Title VII to 
address sexual harassment cases. 105 Under the hostile work environ-
ment analysis, Title VII is violated "[ w ]hen a workplace is so perme-
ated with 'discriminatory intimidation, ridicule, and insult,i06 that is 
rights/ (noting that the bill could seemingly apply in many contexts for which it was 
not intended). 
102 See John 0. Hayward, Anti-Cyber Bullying Statutes: Threat to Student 
Free Speech, 59 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 85, 95 (2011) (citing ARK. CODE ANN.§ 6-18-
514(e) (West 2011); CAL. EDUC. CODE§ 32261 (West 2012); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 14, 
§ 4112D(b)(2) (West 2011); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 1006.147(4) (West 2012); GA. CODE 
ANN. § 20-2-751.4(b)(l) (West 2011); IOWA CODE ANN.§ 280.28(3) (West 2011); 
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 72-8256(b) (West 2011); MD. CODE ANN., Educ. § 7-424.l(b)(l) 
. (West 2011); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 71, § 370(d) (West 2011); MINN. STAT. 
ANN.§ 121A.0695 (West 2012); Mo. ANN. STAT.§ 160.775 (West 2011); NEB. REV. 
STAT. ANN.§ 79-2,137(3) (West 2011); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN.§ 193-F:4(II) (2011); 
N.J. STAT. ANN. § l 8A:3 7-15 (West 2011 ); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 70, § 24-100.4 
(West 2011); OR. REv. STAT. ANN.§ 339.356 (West 2011); 24 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. 
§ 13.1303.1-A (West 2011); R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN.§ 16-21-24 (West 2011); S.C. CODE 
ANN.§ 59-63-140(2011); WASH. REV. CODE ANN.§ 28A.300.285(2) (West2011)). 
103 Harriet A. Hoder, Note, Supervising Cyberspace: A Simple Threshold for 
Public School Jurisdiction Over Students' Online Activity, 50 B.C. L. REV. 1563, 
1566 (2009). 
104 Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, Title VII,§ 703, 78 Stat. 
255 (1964) (current version at 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-2(a)(l) (West 2012)). 
105 See generally Clark Cnty. Sch. Dist. v. Breeden, 532 U.S. 268 (2001). 
106 Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21 (1993) (quoting Meritor 
Savings Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 65 (1986)). 
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96 Sameer Hinduja & Justin W. Patchin, Ojjline Consequences of Online 
Victimization: School Violence and Delinquency, 6(3) J. SCH. VIOLENCE 89, 95 
(2007). 
97 Id at 103, 108 (After compiling data from over 1,300 Internet-using ado-
lescents, the authors noted "the emotional and psychological costs of cyberbullying 
victimization and empirically linked cyberbullying victimization with offline delin-
quent and deviant behavior"). 
98 Sameer Hinduja & Justin W. Patchin, State Cyberbullying Laws: A Brief 
Review of State Cyberbul/ying Laws and Policies, CYBERBULLYING RESEARCH 
CENTER (July 2010), 
http://www.cyberbullying.us/Bullying_ and_ Cyberbullying_ Laws _20100701.pdf; see 
also BULLY POLICE USA, http://www.bullypolice.org/ (last updated Jan. 2012). 
99 Megan Meier Cyberbullying Prevention Act, H.R. 6123, 1 lOth Cong. (2d 
Sess. 2008). The Act was ultimately referred to the House Subcommittee on Crime, 
Terrorism, and Homeland Security on July 28, 2008, where it remains. Bill Summary 
& Status: llOth Congress (2007 - 2008), HR.6123, LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, 
http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?dl lO:h.r.06123: (last visited Feb. 29, 2012). 
100 
"Whoever transmits in interstate or foreign commerce any communication, 
with the intent to coerce, intimidate, harass, or cause substantial emotional distress to 
a person, using electronic means to support severe, repeated, and hostile behavior, 
shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than two years, or both." H.R. 
6123 § 3. 
101 See Steven Kotler, Cyberbullying Bill Could Ensnare Free Speech Rights, 
FoxNEWS.COM (May 14, 2009), 
http ://www.foxnews.com/politics/2009 /05/14/ cyberbullying-ensnare-free-speech-
HOSTILE LEARNING ENVIRONMENT 279 
enacted statutes containing provisions that require school districts to 
adopt anti-cyberbullying policies. 102 However, many of these statutes 
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A. Title VII: Hostile Work Environment Translates into Hos-
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Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 covers discrimination by 
an employer against "any individual with respect to his [or her] com-
pensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment because of 
such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin."104 Hos-
tile work environment law was initially developed under Title VII to 
address sexual harassment cases. 105 Under the hostile work environ-
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not intended). 
102 See John 0. Hayward, Anti-Cyber Bullying Statutes: Threat to Student 
Free Speech, 59 CLEV. ST. L. REv. 85, 95 (2011) (citing ARK. CODE ANN.§ 6-18-
514(e) (West 2011); CAL. EDUC. CODE§ 32261 (West 2012); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 14, 
§ 4112D(b)(2) (West 2011); FLA. STAT. ANN.§ 1006.147(4) (West 2012); GA. CODE 
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(West 2011); OR. REv. STAT. ANN.§ 339.356 (West 2011); 24 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. 
§ 13.1303.1-A (West 2011); R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN.§ 16-21-24 (West2011); S.C. CODE 
ANN.§ 59-63-140(2011); WASH. REV. CODE ANN.§ 28A.300.285(2) (West 2011)). 
103 Harriet A. Hoder, Note, Supervising Cyberspace: A Simple Threshold for 
Public School Jurisdiction Over Students' Online Activity, 50 B.C. L. REV. 1563, 
1566 (2009). 
104 Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, Title VII, § 703, 78 Stat. 
255 (1964) (current version at 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-2(a)(l) (West 2012)). 
105 See generally Clark Cnty. Sch. Dist. v. Breeden, 532 U.S. 268 (2001). 
106 Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21 (1993) (quoting Meritor 
Savings Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 4 77 U.S. 57, 65 (1986)). 
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'sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter conditions of victim's em-
1 d b . kin . t ,,,107 p oyment an create an a us1ve wor g envrronmen . 
Hostile work environment case law presents a well-accepted and 
well-defined standard that is useful in addressing issues of free speech 
in cyberbullying cases. Adults seek protection from unwelcome har-
assment and bullying that interferes with their work environment. 
Likewise, students should be free from unwelcome harassment and 
bullying that interferes with their learning environment. Though 
cyberbullying may not dovetail precisely with the discrimination pro-
hibited by Title VII hostile work environment law, cyberbullying is 
often just as pernicious as the discrimination addressed in Title VII 
and it presents a definite form of harm that is developmentally harm-
ful to minors. Cyberbully laws and Title VII share an interest in pro-
tecting individuals from discriminatory or abusive conduct. 
The Supreme Court has enumerated a list of factors to consider 
when determining whether a workplace is sufficiently hostile to sup-
port a harassment claim under Title VII: a) the frequency of the dis-
criminatory conduct; 108 b) the severity of the conduct; c) the nature of 
the conduct and whether it was unwelcome; and d) whether the con-
duct unreasonably interferes with the employee's work perfor-
mance. 109 
These factors have parallels in the school environment. Although 
an employer's ability to sanction an employee for harassment in the 
workplace is different from a school's authority to sanction a student 
for cyberbullying, the underlying premise-protecting an individual-
remains the same. 110 An employee 'will perform better and advance 
more easily ifthe employee-·can work in an environment that is free of 
harassment and discrimination. Similarly, a student will perform and 
learn better in a school environment that is free of bullying. 
For example, a worker who feels discriminated against may not 
contribute as readily to a discussion in a meeting; likewise, a student 
107 Id. (quoting Meritor Savings Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 67 
(1986)). 
108 The frequency of the discriminatory conduct is also referred to as "perva-
siveness." 
109 Harris, 510 U.S. at 23 (listing factors that help determine whether the 
workplace is sufficiently hostile or abusive to support a sexual harassment claim 
under Title VII); Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 78 (1998). 
110 Title VII protects against discrimination with respect to compensation, 
terms, conditions, or privileges of employment because of an individual's race, color, 
religion, sex, or national origin. 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-2(a)(l ). Protection from cyber-
bullying closely tracks the intended result of Title VII because many victims of 
cyberbullying are singled out for the same reasons. See supra note 9 and accompany-
ing text. 
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who feels discriminated against may be less likely to raise his hand in 
class. An employee may decide to call off work to avoid harassment, 
just as a student may be reluctant to attend school so as to avoid suf-
fering humiliation. Even when cyberbullying occurs entirely outside 
school grounds, empirical data confrrms that children feel the reper-
cussions of cyberbullying at school. 111 Thus, the rationale for applying 
Title VII' s framework should apply regardless of where the speech is 
made. 
B. The Supreme Court Already Incorporated the Hostile 
Work Environment Analysis in Determining School Lia-
bility under Title IX. 
Congress passed Title IX of the Education Amendments in 1972 
to eliminate discrimination on the basis of sex in any education pro-
gram or activity receiving federal financial assistance in order to help 
women gain access to the same educational opportunities as their male 
counterparts. 112 Title IX states, "No person in the United States shall, 
on the basis of sex, be excluded from participation in, be denied the 
benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any education 
program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance .... " 113 
There was uncertainty regarding whether Title IX was intended to 
cover sexual harassment114 until the late 1990s when the Supreme 
Court decided that Title IX covered teacher-on-student sexual harass-
ment in Gebser115 and student-on-student harassment in Davis. 116 
111 Hinduja & Patchin, supra note 98, at 91-92 (surveying over 1,300 adoles-
cent Internet-users, with 31.9% adolescents experiencing repercussions of victimiza-
tion from cyberbullying at school and 26.5% adolescents experiencing repercussions 
of victimization from cyberbullying at home). 
112 See 34 C.F.R. § 106 (1975) ("[T]itle IX ... is designed to eliminate ... 
discrimination on the basis of sex in any education program or activity receiving 
Federal financial assistance."); Susan H. Kosse, Student Designed Home Web Pages: 
Does Title IX or the First Amendment Apply?, 43 ARiz. L. REV. 905, 916 (2001). 
113 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a). 
114 See Davis ex rel. LaShonda D. v. Monroe Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 
629, 664 (1999) (Kennedy, J., dissenting) ("When Title IX was enacted in 1972, the 
concept of 'sexual harassment' as gender discrimination had not been recognized or 
considered by the courts."). 
115 Gebser v. Lago Vista Indep. Sch. Dist., 524 U.S. 274, 281 (1998) ("[A] 
school district can be held liable in damages in cases involving a teacher's sexual 
harassment of a student .... "). 
116 Davis v. Monroe Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629, 648 (1999) (holding 
schools "liable for their deliberate indifference to known acts of peer sexual harass-
ment"). 
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In Gebser, the Court laid out a two-part standard for analyzing 
school liability under Title IX: a) an official with authority to address 
the problem must have actual knowledge of the harassment; 117 and b) 
the official must fail to adequately respond, either with "deliberate 
indifference" or by making an official decision not to correct the vio-
lation. 118 In Gebser, an eighth grade student claimed her male teacher 
made sexually suggestive comments to her, 119 fondled her breasts, and 
engaged in sexual intercourse with her. 120 The Court refused to find 
the school liable under Title IX for sexual harassment because the 
school did not have actual knowledge of the teacher's sexual remarks 
and acts with the student. 121 
Instead of teacher-on-student sexual harassment, Davis involved 
student-on-student harassment. 122 Davis, a fifth grade girl, was sub-
jected to continual verbal and physical harassment by a classmate who 
repeatedly attempted to rub her genital area and breasts and said, "I 
want to feel your boobs," or "I want to get in bed with you." 123 Da-
vis's mother complained to the school, but the school took no action 
to stop the harassment. 124 Subsequently, Davis's mother sued the 
school district under Title IX for having allowed the known harass-
ment to continue. 125 
The District Court and the Eleventh Circuit dismissed Davis's 
claim on the ground that student-on-student harassment does not pro-
vide a private cause of action under the statute. 126 In reversing the 
Eleventh Circuit's holding, the Supreme Court explained that alt-
hough the harasser could not be held liable under Title IX, an entity 
receiving federal funds could be liable under Title IX for its own mis-
conduct. 127 Thus, a school district's failure to respond to student-on-
student harassment in its schools may give rise to a private suit for 
money damages under Title IX. 128 The Court reasoned, "[h ]aving pre-
viously determined that 'sexual harassment' is 'discrimination' in the 
school context under Title IX, we are constrained to conclude that 
student-on-student sexual harassment, if sufficiently severe, can like-
117 Gesber, 524 U.S. at 290. 
118 Id. 
119 Id.at277-78. 
120 Id. at 278. 
121 Id. at 291-93. 
122 Davis, 526 U.S. at 633. 
123 Id. 
124 Id. at 633-34. 
125 Id. at 635-36. 
126 Id. 
127 Id. at 639-40. 
128 Id. at 640. 
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wise rise to the level of discrimination actionable under the statute." 129 
The Court suggested that it was possible the school created a hostile 
environment for Davis by failing to take disciplinary actions against 
the student harasser. 130 However, "[public schools] are properly held 
liable in damages only where they are deliberately indifferent to sexu-
al harassment . . . . " 131 
In Davis, the Court defined sexual harassment as a form of sex 
discrimination similar to Title VIL The Court cited a Title VII hostile 
work environment case while outlining the standard for sexual har-
assment among students: "a plaintiff must establish sexual harassment 
of students that is so severe, pervasive, and objectively offensive, and 
that so undermines and detracts from the victims' educational experi-
ence, that the victim-students are effectively denied equal access to an 
institution's resources and opportunities." 132 The Court cited yet an-
other Title VII hostile work environment case to explain: "[ w ]hether 
gender-oriented conduct rises to the level of actionable 'harassment' 
thus 'depends on a constellation of surrounding circumstances, expec-
tations, and relationships."' 133 
Yet, a student can be cyberbullied for many reasons beyond the 
protected classes embodied in Title VII and Title IX. To effectively 
address the wide array of cyberbullying abuse, this proposed test must 
reach beyond the factual scenarios that fall under Title VII and Title 
IX. Moreover, it is harder to prove· a claim of student-on-student har-
assment than a claim of teacher-on-student harassment under Title 
IX. 134 This offers yet another example of why the stringent standard in 
Title IX, which requires "deliberate indifference to sexual harass-
ment," would often fall short of protecting students from cyberbully-
ing.135 
129 Id. at 650 (citations omitted). 
130 Id. at 639 ("The complaint alleges that LaShonda had suffered during the 
months of harassment," which manifested in the form of a drop in grades and even the 
discovery of a purported "suicide note."). 
131 Davis, 526 U.S. at 650. 
132 Id. at 651 (citing Meritor Savings Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 67 
(1986)). 
133 Id. (citing Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services, Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 82 
(1998)). See also Davis, 526 U.S. at 651 (noting that whether conduct constitutes 
harassment depends on several factors, "including, but not limited to, the ages of the 
harasser and the victim and the number of individuals involved."). 
134 Davis, 526 U.S. at 653 (''Peer harassment, in particular, is less likely to 
[qualify as a breach of Title IX] than is teacher-student harassment."). 
135 Davis, 526 U.S. at 650. See also Davis, 526 U.S. at 648-49 (explaining 
that schools are not required to "remedy" peer harassment, but "must merely respond 
to known peer harassment in a manner that is not clearly unreasonable."). 
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V. APPL YING THE FOUR FACTORS FROM A HOSTILE 
WORK ENVIRONMENT TO A HOSTILE EDUCATION 
ENVIRONMENT 
To extend protection to student cyberbullying victims, this Note 
proposes a test that employs Title VII' s hostile work environment 
analysis using a sliding scale approach. The proposed test advances 
and modernizes the existing student free-speech analysis in order to 
provide better guidance to schools and courts when analyzing cyber 
speech. Unlike the Tinker tetralogy, this test is specifically designed 
for only one classification of speech: cyber speech. 136 This Note treats 
all cyber speech as occurring off-campus because it is impractical for 
schools to determine whether cyber speech occurs during school or a 
h 1 d . . 137 sc oo -sponsore activity. 
Cyberbullying cases are fact-intensive inquiries and thus a bright-
line test will prove unworkable. 138 A multifactor analysis is more ap-
propriate. The following four factors, which are borrowed from hos-
tile work environment law, will aid schools and courts in determining 
whether or not a student's cyber speech rises to the level of cyberbul-
lying: a) pervasiveness; b) severity; c) unwelcomeness; and d) inter-
ference with the educational environment. 
This four-factor test employs objective and subjective analysis. 
The first two factors involve an objective inquiry: namely, whether a 
reasonable person would consider the harassment to be severe or per-
vasive. The third and fourth factors are subjective and look to whether 
the plaintiff was actually offended and affected. 139 This objective-
subjective standard takes a "middle path between making actionable 
any conduct that is merely offensive and requiring the conduct to 
cause a tangible psychological injury." 140 The objective factors elimi-
136 This test only covers speech communicated through the Internet. Yet, 
cyber speech could take numerous forms, including text, video, images, audio, or a 
combination thereof. 
137 Students can access portable cell phones, iPads, or laptops during any hour 
of the day. A student can access the Internet at the school computer lab or school 
library. It would be unduly burdensome to pinpoint an alleged cyber bully's exact 
location on a given day or hour to determine whether he was at school or participating 
in a school-sponsored activity at the time the cyber speech posted on the Internet. 
138 Consider the repercussions of an offensive "tweet" that is published to 
hundreds of people, to the same post in a small Facebook group that's accessible to 
only 10-15 people, to the same post sent as a private message between two people. 
139 Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 22 (1993) (stating that where 
an environment "would reasonably be perceived, and is perceived, as hostile or abu-
sive," a Title VII claim is potentially available) (emphasis added). 
140 Id. at 21. 
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nate eggshell plaintiffs, while the subjective factors ensure that each 
plaintiff was actually affected by the online abuse. 
A. Objective Factors: Pervasiveness and Severity Factors 
Applied to School Settings. 
1. Pervasiveness 
The pervasiveness factor requires schools to consider the frequen-
cy of the offensive speech. The more frequent the speech, the more 
likely it is to be sanctionable. Unlike most Title VII claims, which are 
based on discrete acts of discrimination, a hostile work environment 
claim is based on the cumulative effect of several acts. 141 
Similarly, a single comment may not be enough for school offi-
cials to intervene. However, if the same or similar statements are 
made numerous times and, consequently, invade the victim's educa-
tional environment, it may require school intervention. For example, 
Sam writes on Alex's Facebook wall, "you're such a tool." That sin-
gle statement may not rise to the level of requiring school interven-
tion. Yet if Sam habitually calls Alex a "dumbass," "moron," or ')erk" 
through various channels of social networking, the school may have to 
take action to prohibit Sam's speech. 
2. Severity 
a. Threat of Physical Harm 
In addition to judging the pervasiveness of the speech, this test al-
so requires that a school or court look at the severity of the cyber con-
duct. In order to gauge the level of severity of another's speech, it 
must be determined if the speech is "physically threatening or humili-
ating." 142 
The school is always permitted to intervene if there is a threat of 
physical violence. A threat of violence is sanctionable per se, as 
speech that inherently alters a student's learning conditions. A physi-
cal threat of violence should be fairly easy to recognize, but there is 
always a risk the recipient may mistake a joke or sarcastic comment as 
141 Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101, 117 (2002) ("A 
hostile work environment claim is composed of a series of separate acts that collec-
tively constitute one unlawful employment practice.") (citation omitted). 
142 Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 23 (1993). See also Oncale v. 
Sundowner Offshore Services, Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 81 (1998) (noting that "male-on-
male horseplay" is beyond the purview of Title VII). 
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V. APPL YING THE FOUR FACTORS FROM A HOSTILE 
WORK ENVIRONMENT TO A HOSTILE EDUCATION 
ENVIRONMENT 
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h 1 d . . 137 sc oo -sponsore activity. 
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This four-factor test employs objective and subjective analysis. 
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combination thereof. 
137 Students can access portable cell phones, iPads, or laptops during any hour 
of the day. A student can access the Internet at the school computer lab or school 
library. It would be unduly burdensome to pinpoint an alleged cyber bully's exact 
location on a given day or hour to determine whether he was at school or participating 
in a school-sponsored activity at the time the cyber speech posted on the Internet. 
138 Consider the repercussions of an offensive "tweet" that is published to 
hundreds of people, to the same post in a small Facebook group that's accessible to 
only 10-15 people, to the same post sent as a private message between two people. 
139 Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 22 (1993) (stating that where 
an environment "would reasonably be perceived, and is perceived, as hostile or abu-
sive," a Title VII claim is potentially available) (emphasis added). 
140 Id. at 21. 
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a physical threat. 143 One of the problematic issues surrounding cyber 
speech is that it often precludes the recipient from hearing the intona-
tion in the speaker's voice or from observing the speaker's non-verbal 
cues. This increases the risk of misinterpreting the speaker's intended 
message. This Note's proposed test addresses that concern by requir-
ing an objective analysis. This prevents an innocuous statement from 
being perceived as a physical threat because the test requires that a 
reasonable person in the plaintiffs position would have interpreted 
the speech as a physical threat. 
b. Discriminatory Speech 
"[N]o single act can more quickly alter the conditions of employ-
ment and create an abusive working environment than the use of [a] 
racial epithet .... " 144 Similarly, discriminatory speech based on race, 
color, religion, sex, or national origin alters students' learning condi-
tions and is considered highly severe; thus, such speech will almost 
always require school officials to interfere. 145 "[Public schools] must 
inculcate the habits and manners of civility as values in themselves 
conducive to happiness and as indispensable to the practice of self-
govemment in the community and the nation."146 Children must learn 
that discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex, or national 
origin is not tolerated by society. 
Keep in mind that the speech must be directed at an identifiable 
person or group in order to satisfy the proposed test's objective and 
subjective elements. Moreover, context matters. For example, if a 
Caucasian student makes a general· racial slur about blacks and there 
are only four African American students in the class, then a reasona-
ble person might conclude that the racial slur was targeting the Afri-
can American students. Yet if an African American student makes a 
143 For example, people often use the expression, "I am going to kill you" 
very loosely in order to communicate their innocent frustration, sarcasm, or humor. 
144 Rodgers v. Western-Southern Life Ins. Co., 12 F.3d 668, 675 (7th Cir. 
1993) (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
145 See Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, Title VII, § 703, 78 
Stat. 255 (1964) (current version at 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-2(a)(l) (West 2012)). Alt-
hough Title VII does not cover discrimination based on sexual orientation, this Note 
includes sexual orientation discrimination, as well as discrimination based on disabil-
ity, in the category of highly severe speech. Given recent incidents of cyberbullying 
targeting homosexual students, schools ought to provide sensitivity to the subject by 
categorizing it as per se severe speech. See supra notes 18-20, and accompanying 
text. Furthermore, we may adopt the same disability discrimination principles from 
the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990. 42 U.S.C.A. § 12101-12213 (West 
2011). 
146 Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 681 (1986). 
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racial slur about blacks, then the speech is more ambiguous because 
the speaker is targeting his own race. A reasonable person might con-
clude the second statement is not as severe under the circumstances. 
c. Humiliation 
If the speech does not rise to the level of a physical threat or pro-
hibited discrimination, the school or court should next determine 
whether the speech is "humiliating" so as to satisfy the severity prong. 
Whether speech is humiliating turns on the content of the speech and 
the manner in which it is communicated. If the speech deals with very 
sensitive or private information, 147 schools and courts should view the 
speech as more severe because the revelation of private information 
has great potential for humiliation. Likewise, if the speaker decides to 
broadcast or write an offensive remark in a public forum, that speech 
could be more humiliating for the victim than if it was only communi-
cated to a few individuals. 
Speech is objectively severe if a reasonable person would under-
stand it to be "vulgar," "lewd," or if the character of the speech is 
"plainly offensive."148 Swear words, vulgarities, and sexually explicit 
speech like the speech in Fraser would qualify as more severe speech. 
Similar to an employee who complains about a coworker's har-
assment, ·a student who directly complains to a school official about 
cyberbullying is demonstrating that the bully's speech is negatively 
interfering with his or her educational environment. Additional evi-
dence may include a drop in grades due to distractions caused by 
cyberbullying, decreased attendance due to the fear of violence or 
humiliation, or feelings of anxiety and depression that interfere with 
the victim's learning. 149 
147 E.g. supra notes 18-25, and accompanying text. Tyler Clementi's private 
relations with another male student were broadcasted on the Internet. 
148 Fraser, 478 U.S. at 683 ("The pervasive sexual innuendo in Fraser's 
speech was plainly offensive to both teachers and students - indeed to any mature 
person."). 
149 The victim's friends and family may also provide corroborative testimony 
about the victim's experiences. Importantly, the subjective element of this test is more 
likely to be satisfied if a student can show a bully's cyber speech negatively affected 
his or her learning environment in school. 
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"plainly offensive."148 Swear words, vulgarities, and sexually explicit 
speech like the speech in Fraser would qualify as more severe speech. 
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assment, ·a student who directly complains to a school official about 
cyberbullying is demonstrating that the bully's speech is negatively 
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B. Subjective Factors: the Unwelcome Factor and Interfer-
ence Factor Applied to School Settings. 
1. Unwelcome Speech 
Sexual conduct becomes unlawful within the hostile work envi-
ronment context only when it is unwelcome. 150 The challenged con-
duct must be unwelcome "in the sense that the employee did not solic-
it or incite it, and in the sense that the employee regarded the conduct 
as undesirable or offensive."151 
a. The Cyberbully's Playful Joking 
The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) 
acknowledges that sexual attraction may often play a role in day-to-
day social exchanges between employees, stating that '"the distinction 
between invited, uninvited-but-welcome, offensive-but-tolerated, and 
flatly rejected' sexual advances may well be difficult to discem." 152 
Similarly, it may be difficult to decipher when speech amongst stu-
dents is unwelcome because students often joke around in an innocent 
playful manner. What appears to be a joke may be unwelcome by the 
recipient. This is just one example illustrating that the inquiry is ex-
tremely fact-intensive and requires a flexible test. 
In determining whether the speech was unwelcome, a victim's 
admission is preferred, but there may also be strong circumstantial 
evidence of unwelcomeness from friends, teachers, parents, and coun-
selors. Some victims may be too embarrassed to admit they were af-
150 See Meritor Savings Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 68 (1986) (requir-
ing unwelcomeness analysis); 29 C.F.R. § 1604.1 l(a) (2011) (referring to 
"[ u ]nwelcome sexual advances"); EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, 
EEOC No. 915.002, ENFORCEMENT GUIDANCE ON HARRIS V. FORKLIFT SYS., ]NC. 
(1994), 1994 WL 1747814, at *5 ("It is well-settled that a charging party's claim will 
fail if the allegedly offensive conduct is found to be 'welcome."'). 
151 EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, EEOC No. 915.002, 
ENFORCEMENT GUIDANCE ON HARRIS V. FORKLIFT SYS., ]NC. (1994), 1994 WL 1747814, 
at *6; EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, No. N-915-050, POLICY 
GUIDANCE ON CURRENT ISSUES OF SEXUAL HARASSMENT (1990). 1990 WL 1104701, 
at *4 (quoting Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 903 (11th Cir. 1982)). 
152 EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, No. N-915-050, POLICY 
GUIDANCE ON CURRENT ISSUES OF SEXUAL HARASSMENT (1990). 1990 WL 1104701, 
at *4 (quoting Barnes v. Costle, 561F.2d983, 999 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (MacK.innon, J., 
concurring)); 29 C,F.R. § 1604.1 l(b) (2012) (recommending a review of the "totality 
of the circumstances"). 
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fected by a cyberbully' s speech. 153 A parent may inform the school 
that their child was sobbing after encountering cyberbullying. A 
teacher may notify the school that the victim has not been attending 
class, while a friend may explain that the victim was cutting that par-
ticular class in order to avoid the cyberbully. A school counselor may 
describe how distraught the student was while discussing the cyber-
bullying incident. 154 It should be noted that because this factor is sub-
jective and focuses on the victim, a cyberbully's insistence that he or 
she was only joking and meant no harm·is entirely irrelevant. 155 
b. The Victim's Prior Playful Joking 
In hostile work environment law, the victim's "[o]ccasional use of 
sexually explicit language does not necessarily negate a claim that the 
sexual conduct was unwelcome." 156 The EEOC explains, "[a]lthough 
a charging party's use of sexual terms or off-color jokes may suggest 
that sexual comments by others in that situation were not unwelcome, 
more extreme and abusive or persistent comments [may] not be ex-
cused."157 Thus, a plaintiffs "use of foul language or sexual innuendo 
in a consensual setting does not waive 'her legal protections against 
unwelcome harassment."' 158 
For the same reasons, a student victim's use of foul language or 
horseplay has little probative value and does not necessarily detract 
from the possibility that the harassment directed at the victim was 
unwelcome speech. This invites the question: what if two students are 
harassing each other and creating a hostile educational environment 
for one another? School officials should treat these as two distinct 
153 A social outcast may feel even more isolated and upset after admitting the 
speech deeply affected him or her. 
154 Schools must do their best to avoid misattributing the student's behavior 
as responses to cyberbullying when the behavior may be the result of outside factors. 
The school will have greater assurance that the negative behavior is an indicator of 
cyberbullying if the behavior is proximate to a potential cyberbullying encounter. 
Negative behavior that occurs days after a victim discovers the cyberbully's speech 
should not necessarily be construed as a reaction to the speech. 
155 The cyberbully's joking behavior only matters ifthe victim welcomed the 
speech as a joke. School officials may consider the ostensibly joking behavior during 
the objective portion of this test, where schools must determine whether a reasonable 
person would find the ''joke" to be severe or pervasive harassment. 
156 EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, No. N-915-050, POLICY 
GUIDANCE ON CURRENT ISSUES OF SEXUAL HARASSMENT (1990). 1990 WL 1104701, 
at *6. 
157 Id. 
158 Swentek v. USAIR, Inc., 830 F.2d 552, 557 (4th Cir. 1987) (quoting Katz 
v. Dole, 709 F.2d 251, 254 n.3 (4th Cir. 1983)). 
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occurrences of bullying and two separate hostile environments. In 
other words, hostile cyber speech between two parties that is severe or 
pervasive enough to alter the conditions of each party's educational 
environment does not diminish the school's right to intervene and 
limit both parties' speech. 159 
Notably, this approach does not excuse a student who goes over-
board in standing up for herself. For example, suppose Josh constantly 
bullies George on his Facebook page. George finally works up the 
courage to respond to Josh on Facebook, but he unleashes so much 
built-up anger that he makes a severe threat. George's actions may be 
subject to school sanctions under this test just as Josh's incessant bul-
lying of George may be cause for the school to intervene. George's 
status as the first victim does not insulate him from being classified as 
a cyberbully. This approach ensures fair and consistent treatment of 
all parties involved. This policy encourages conflict resolution when 
responding to a student's offensive speech, and it helps to prevent one 
student's cyberbullying from escalating into a nasty brawl over the 
Internet. To avoid these types of cases, schools need to educate stu-
dents about how to properly respond to cyberbullying. 160 
c. Reporting the Incident 
According to hostile work environment law, the charging party's 
claim will be considerably strengthened if there is a contemporaneous 
complaint or protest. 161 For a complaint to be "contemporaneous," it 
should be made while the harassment is ongoing or shortly after it has 
ceased. 162 However, "[ w ]hile a complaint or protest is helpful to a 
charging party's case, it is not a necessary element of the claim."163 
159 Given that each party acted as a cyberbully and a victim, school officials 
may consider mandating group counseling between the parties rather than punishing 
them both. Yet, if each party exhibited very severe and pervasive cyberbullying, then 
the school may consider punishing both students. 
160 School officials must make it clear that being a victim of cyberbullying 
does not give you the right to cyberbully someone else. Yet students will only under-
stand they will be held accountable for inappropriate responses to cyberbullying if 
schools incorporate these policies into their rules, handbook definition of cyberbully-
ing, and classroom curriculum. 
161 EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, No. N-915-050, POLICY 
GUIDANCE ON CURRENT ISSUES OF SEXUAL HARASSMENT (1990). 1990 WL 1104701, 
at *5 ("When there is some indication of welcomeness or when the credibility of the 
parties is at issue, the charging party's claim will be considerably strengthened if she 
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Furthermore, the EEOC recognizes that fear may explain a delay 
in opposing or reporting the conduct. 164 If the victim failed to prompt-
ly complain, the investigator must ascertain why and determine 
whether the victim's conduct is consistent with his or her allega-
tions. 165 Moreover, the significance of whether the victim complained 
contemporaneously varies depending upon "the nature of the sexual 
advances and the context in which the alleged incidents occurred." 166 
When confronted with conflicting evidence as to welcomeness, the 
EEOC looks at "the record as a whole and the totality of circumstanc-
es," and evaluates each situation on a case-by-case basis. 167 
Similarly, students may more easily demonstrate that the speech 
was unwelcome if they make a contemporaneous complaint about it to 
school officials while the harassment is ongoing or shortly after it has 
ceased. 168 Like an employee who is afraid to report harassment, a stu-
dent may choose not to inform school officials about the bullying be-
cause he or she is frightened the bully might retaliate. 169 Similar to the 
employment context, the failure to report a cyberbullying incident 
does not destroy the student's assertion that the bully's conduct was 
unwelcome. A contemporaneous complaint to school officials merely 
strengthens the student's claim that the speech was unwelcome. 
2. Interference with the Victim's Education 
In order to support a hostile work environment claim under Title 
VII, the harassment must unreasonably interfere with the employee's 
164 Id. 
165 Id. 
166 Id. (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 1604.ll(b) (2012)). 
167 Id. at *5 (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 1604.1 l(b) (2012)). 
168 Interestingly, a student enduring harassment on Facebook has the option to 
"report" the conduct to Facebook. A student may support her position that the speech 
was unwelcome by demonstrating to the school that he or she reported it on Face-
book. Facebook officials have the discretion to remove the bully from Facebook by 
deleting her Facebook page and denying the bully the ability to register again with the 
same email address. Nonetheless, the bully may register under another email address 
and create another page. The victim may still be frightened that the bully will retaliate 
with more severe and pervasive bullying once the bully loses her Facebook account. 
See Safety Center, FACEBOOK.COM, http://www.facebook.com/safety/groups/teens/ 
(last visited Mar. 1, 2012) (instructing teens how to report abusive content on Face-
book). 
169 One study "found that almost one-third (32%) of cyberbullying victims 
removed themselves from the online venue in which the cyberbullying occurred, 
while one in five (20%) felt forced to stay offline completely for a period of time .... 
While most cyberbullying victims were comfortable talking about their victimization 
to a friend (56.6%), fewer than 9% of victims informed a teacher or an adult." Hindu-
ja & Patchin, supra note 98, at 95 (citation omitted). 
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work performance. 170 Hostile work environment law only forbids be-
havior that is so offensive that it alters the conditions of the victim's 
employment. 171 Similarly, under the Title IX analysis, "a plaintiff 
must establish sexual harassment of students that is so severe, perva-
sive, and objectively offensive, and that so undermines and detracts 
from the victims' educational experience, that the victim-students are 
effectively denied equal access to an institution's resources and op-
portunities." 172 
Under this test, the cyberbullying must also interfere with the vic-
tim's educational environment. In other words, the cyber speech must 
be so severe and pervasive that it actually altered the student's learn-
ing conditions or greatly undermines the victim's educational experi-
ence.173 
The most obvious example is physical exclusion: a victim who 
endures such severe and pervasive cyberbullying that it physically 
deprives the victim of access to school facilities or resources. 174 Con-
sider a student who receives so many constant threats in the form of 
text messages, emails, and Facebook posts that he feels completely 
immobilized by fear and becomes too scared to attend class or eat 
lunch in the school cafeteria. 175 Other examples of interference with a 
student's educational environment include: a drop in grades; the ina-
bility to learn or complete assignments due to severe anxiety associat-
ed with the cyberbullying; the inability to work with peers because of 
their involvement in the cyberbullying; skipping sports practice for 
fear of confronting the bullies in the locker room; not participating in 
class discussions because the student fears harassment or humiliation; 
or retaliation due to the victim'·s reporting of cyberbullying to school 
officials. 
It is not difficult to satisfy this factor, since most cyberbullying 
will likely pose some sort of distraction at school. Some disruptions 
170 See Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 23 (1993). This interfer-
ence requirement is similar to Tinker's substantial and material interference test. See 
Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 509 (1969). However, 
the test in Tinker may be satisfied by a general interruption of the operation of the 
school, which may be wholly unrelated to the victim of harassment. 171 Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 81 (1998) ("[I]t 
forbids only behavior so objectively offensive as to alter the conditions of the victim's 
employment."). 
172 Davis ex rel. Lashonda D. v. Monroe Cty. Bd. Of Educ., 526 U.S. 629, 
651 (1999). 173 Id. at 650. 174 Id. at 650-51 (describing a hypothetical "in which male students physically 
threaten their female peers every day, successfully preventing the female students 
from using a particular school resource"). 
175 Id. at 650. 
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are more serious than others. Schools must weigh the seriousness of 
the interference with the other factors to determine whether or not 
they should intervene. A highly severe and pervasive account of 
cyberbullying coupled with a victim who only experiences minor dis-
tractions at school may still warrant the school's prohibition of the 
cyberbully' s speech. Practically speaking, school officials may be 
more inclined to limit a student's speech and protect a victim if there 
is a serious interference with the victim's education-e.g. the victim 
missed school for a week. Nevertheless, the objective factors of this 
test prevent schools from limiting a student's cyber speech based sole-
ly on the complaints of an oversensitive child. A school may never 
limit a student's cyber speech without some level of both severity and 
pervasiveness. 
VI. HOW THE TEST OPERATES 
A. Knowledge Triggers the School's Duty to Protect the Stu-
dent Victim 
As discussed above, this test serves as a tool to identify when 
school officials are able to sanction a cyberbully for his or her cyber 
speech. The school must have some knowledge of the incident before 
it is responsible for taking action to limit the cyberbully' s speech. The 
school's knowledge, however, need not come from the victim. School 
officials may learn about the incident through another student, a par-
ent, friend, teacher, or guidance counselor. Once the school has 
knowledge of the alleged cyberbullying, the school has the duty to 
investigate the incident and, if necessary, take action to protect the 
victim. This does not mean that the school must automatically sus-
pend or otherwise punish the cyberbully. While sanctions are certainly 
one way of protecting the victim, school counselors ought to employ 
mediation and conflict resolution to prevent further cyberbullying. 
B. This Test Operates Like a Sliding Scale 
When confronted with a hostile work environment charge, courts 
and· EEOC investigators look at the record as a whole and the totality 
of circumstances, evaluating each situation on a case-by-case basis. 176 
176 Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 23 (1993) ("[W]hether an 
environment is hostile or abusive can be determined only by looking at all the circum-
stances.") (internal quotation marks omitted). See also 29 C.F.R. § 1604.1 l(b) (2012); 
); EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, EEOC No. 915.002, 
ENFORCEMENT GUIDANCE ON HARRIS V. FORKLIFT SYS., INC. (1994), 1994 WL 1747814, 
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are more serious than others. Schools must weigh the seriousness of 
the interference with the other factors to determine whether or not 
they should intervene. A highly severe and pervasive account of 
cyberbullying coupled with a victim who only experiences minor dis-
tractions at school may still warrant the school's prohibition of the 
cyberbully' s speech. Practically speaking, school officials may be 
more inclined to limit a student's speech and protect a victim if there 
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test prevent schools from limiting a student's cyber speech based sole-
ly on the complaints of an oversensitive child. A school may never 
limit a student's cyber speech without some level of both severity and 
pervasiveness. 
VI. HOW THE TEST OPERATES 
A. Knowledge Triggers the School's Duty to Protect the Stu-
dent Victim 
As discussed above, this test serves as a tool to identify when 
school officials are able to sanction a cyberbully for his or her cyber 
speech. The school must have some knowledge of the incident before 
it is responsible for taking action to limit the cyberbully' s speech. The 
school's knowledge, however, need not come from the victim. School 
officials may learn about the incident through another student, a par-
ent, friend, teacher, or guidance counselor. Once the school has 
knowledge of the alleged cyberbullying, the school has the duty to 
investigate the incident and, if necessary, take action to protect the 
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The Court explained that this approach is not, and by its nature cannot 
be, a mathematically precise test. 177 It is a flexible standard that oper-
ates like a sliding scale. 178 For example, the required level of severity 
"varies inversely with the pervasiveness or frequency of the con-
duct." 179 Each of the four factors, however, must be met. If appropri-
ate under the circumstances, weak evidence of one element may be 
offset by particularly strong evidence of another. 
Similarly, school officials should use these four factors 180 like a 
sliding scale to gauge their ability to intervene and restrict a student's 
speech. The school should look to the totality of the circumstances to 
ensure that all four factors of this Note's proposed test are satisfied. 
For example, if the speech is very severe and very pervasive, but the 
attempted victim remains unaffected, there are no grounds for the 
school to intervene and sanction the cyberbully. 
C. Application 
To illustrate how the proposed test operates, recall the hypotheti-
cals presented at the outset of this Note. Lindsey, a high school soph-
omore, logs onto her Facebook page from home. Stressed from a long 
day at school, Lindsey updates her status and writes, "Amy is a fat 
cow. Don't ever talk to her again, just tell her MOO." Katie is a four-
teen year-old eighth grade student at the same school who decides to 
update her Facebook status after school hours and writes, "In case you 
didn't already know it, I'm the S*#%. Everyone else should go to 
hell." Is Lindsey's or Katie's speech protected by the First Amend-
ment? Or, may school officials punish them for their cyber speech? 
Example 1: Lindsey says, "Amy is a fat cow. Don't ever talk to 
that cow, just tell her MOO." 
at *4 (instructing investigators to examine, among other things, the nature of the 
conduct, whether it was verbal or physical, the context in which it was physically 
threatening or humiliating, whether it was unwelcome, and whether it unreasonably 
interfered with an employee's work performance). 
177 Harris, 510 U.S. at 22. 
178 EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, No. N-915-050, POLICY 
GUIDANCE ON CURRENT ISSUES OF SEXUAL HARASSMENT (1990). 1990 WL 1104701, 
at *9-10 (explaining that the more severe the harassment is, the less need there is to 
show the harassment was frequent). 
179 Ellison v. Brady, 924 F.2d 872, 878 (9th Cir. 1991) (citing King v. Bd. of 
Regents of Univ. of Wis. Sys., 898 F.2d 533, 537 (7th Cir. 1990). 
180 The factors are: a) pervasiveness; b) severity; c) unwelcomeness; and d) 
interference with the educational environment. 
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Upon investigating the incident, school officials discover that 
Lindsey sent Amy three text messages the same evening saying, 
"Moo!" School officials also find out that Amy experienced harass-
ment at school the next day as everyone was yelling "Moo" at her in 
the hallways in between classes and during lunch. Amy's friend later 
reported that she had not seen Amy at their lunch table in almost a 
week. School officials meet with Amy and she explains that she has 
been hiding in the bathroom in order to avoid confronting Lindsey and 
other harassers in the lunchroom. She also explains that she has been 
so fraught with shame and humiliation about Lindsey's words that she 
has become more self-conscious about her weight and recently 
stopped eating lunch. Amy continues to explain that it has been hard 
for her to pay attention in class because she gets very hungry from not 
eating lunch and because she is nervous people will "Moo" during 
class. 
1) Pervasiveness 
Less Pervasive Pervasive (Potential Cyberbullying) 
Lindsey's speech is objectively pervasive because she posted it on 
her Facebook wall, where all of her friends (and Amy) could view the 
speech. Note that the speech would be considered less pervasive if 
Lindsey communicated it privately rather than in a public forum. Ad-
ditionally, it is considered even more pervasive because the speech 
was repeated in three subsequent text messages. 
2) Severity 
Less Severe More Severe (Potential Cyberbullying) 
Lindsey's speech is objectively severe because it is a form of hu-
miliation directed at a physical characteristic of Amy: her weight. 
School officials should consider cyber speech about physical charac-
teristics that carry a public stigma as more severe. In particular, body 
294 JOURNAL OF LAW, TECHNOLOGY & THE INTERNET [Vol. 3:2] 
The Court explained that this approach is not, and by its nature cannot 
be, a mathematically precise test. 177 It is a flexible standard that oper-
ates like a sliding scale. 178 For example, the required level of severity 
"varies inversely with the pervasiveness or frequency of the con-
duct." 179 Each of the four factors, however, must be met. If appropri-
ate under the circumstances, weak evidence of one element may be 
offset by particularly strong evidence of another. 
Similarly, school officials should use these four factors 180 like a 
sliding scale to gauge their ability to intervene and restrict a student's 
speech. The school should look to the totality of the circumstances to 
ensure that all four factors o_f this Note's proposed test are satisfied. 
For example, if the speech is very severe and very pervasive, but the 
attempted victim remains unaffected, there are no grounds for the 
school to intervene and sanction the cyberbully. 
C. Application 
To illustrate how the proposed test operates, recall the hypotheti-
cals presented at the outset of this Note. Lindsey, a high school soph-
omore, logs onto her Facebook page from home. Stressed from a long 
day at school, Lindsey updates her status and writes, "Amy is a fat 
cow. Don't ever talk to her again, just tell her MOO." Katie is a four-
teen year-old eighth grade student at the same school who decides to 
update her Facebook status after school hours and writes, "In case you 
didn't already know it, I'm the S*#%. Everyone else should go to 
hell." Is Lindsey's or Katie's speech protected by the First Amend-
ment? Or, may school officials punish them for their cyber speech? 
Example 1: Lindsey says, "Amy is a fat cow. Don't ever talk to 
that cow, just tell her MOO." 
at *4 (instructing investigators to examine, among other things, the nature of the 
conduct, whether it was verbal or physical, the context in which it was physically 
threatening or humiliating, whether it was unwelcome, and whether it unreasonably 
interfered with an employee's work performance). 
177 Harris, 510 U.S. at 22. 
178 EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, No. N-915-050, POLICY 
GUIDANCE ON CURRENT ISSUES OF SEXUAL HARASSMENT (1990). 1990 WL 1104701, 
at *9-10 (explaining that the more severe the harassment is, the less need there is to 
show the harassment was frequent). 
179 Ellison v. Brady, 924 F.2d 872, 878 (9th Cir. 1991) (citing King v. Bd. of 
Regents of Univ. of Wis. Sys., 898 F.2d 533, 537 (7th Cir. 1990). 
180 The factors are: a) pervasiveness; b) severity; c) unwelcomeness; and d) 
interference with the educational environment. 
HOSTILE LEARNING ENVIRONMENT 295 
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Lindsey sent Amy three text messages the same evening saying, 
"Moo!" School officials also find out that Amy experienced harass-
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reported that she had not seen Amy at their lunch table in almost a 
week. School officials meet with Amy and she explains that she has 
been hiding in the bathroom in order to avoid confronting Lindsey and 
other harassers in the lunchroom. She also explains that she has been 
so fraught with shame and humiliation about Lindsey's words that she 
has become more self-conscious about her weight and recently 
stopped eating lunch. Amy continues to explain that it has been hard 
for her to pay attention in class because she gets very hungry from not 
eating lunch and because she is nervous people will "Moo" during 
class. 
1) Pervasiveness 
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Lindsey's speech is objectively pervasive because she posted it on 
her Facebook wall, where all of her friends (and Amy) could view the 
speech. Note that the speech would be considered less pervasive if 
Lindsey communicated it privately rather than in a public forum. Ad-
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weight is objectively severe due to the fact that eating disorders are 
most likely to develop during the teenage years. 181 
The speech would be considered more severe if it included a 
threat of physical harm, discrimination, or vulgarities such as swear 
words or inappropriate sexual innuendos. Even without those, howev-
er, Lindsey's speech is sufficiently severe, especially considering it 
incited other students to harass Amy. 
3) Unwelcomeness 
Welcome Unwelcome (Potential Cyberbullying) 
Here, Amy averred to school officials that Lindsey's speech was 
unwelcome. Even if she had not, however, the circumstantial evidence 
of unwelcomeness is very strong. Amy stopped eating lunch· and hid 
in the bathroom during her break. Amy's friend's statements further 
corroborate Amy's emotional distress. 
4) Interference in the victim's educational environment 
No Interference Interference (Potential Cyberbullying) 
Lindsey's speech altered Amy's educational environment. Amy 
complained of an inability to focus in class due to extreme anxiety. 
Moreover, Amy experienced physical exclusion as she was unable to 
walk around school or eat lunch for fear of her classmates teasing her. 
All four factors strongly support the creation of a hostile learning 
environment. In this example, Lindsey's speech rises to the level of 
cyberbullying, which triggers the school's duty to intervene and re-
strict Lindsey's speech in order to protect Amy. Accordingly, school 
181 H. W. Hoek, Incidence, prevalence and mortality of anorexia and other 
eating disorders. 19 CURRENTOPINIONINPSYCIDATRY, 389-394 (2007) (Among 
young women, the prevalence of anorexia and bulimia is estimated to be 0.3% and 
1.0% respectively. Prevalence rates of anorexia and bulimia appear to increase during 
the transition from adolescence to young adulthood.). 
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officials may sanction Lindsey for her cyber speech without violating 
Lindsay's First Amendment rights. 182 
Example 2: Katie says, "In case you didn't already know it, I'm 
the S *#%. Everyone else should go to helL" 
In contrast to Example 1, Katie's cyber speech does not rise to the 
level of cyberbullying. Katie's speech is offensive due to her use of 
obscenities, yet it is not sufficiently severe because it does not dis-
criminate on the basis of race, religion, sex, gender, national origin, 
ethnicity, or sexual orientation. The lack of either a threat of physical 
harm, sexual harassment, or use of inappropriate sexual innuendos 
further illustrates that Katie's speech is not objectively severe. 
The pervasive nature of Katie's speech creates a stronger case for 
cyberbullying. Katie's speech is pervasive because it was on her Fa-
cebook wall for the general public to view. The facts here assume that 
Katie does not have restrictive privacy settings applied to her account, 
which may confine her speech to a smaller number of people. Such 
privacy settings would reduce the pervasiveness of her speech. 
Despite Katie's pervasive use of obscenities, the school cannot 
sanction Katie because her speech did not target any particular person 
or group. 183 Katie directed her speech at everyone in general but no-
body in particular. Without an identifiable victim, there is simply no 
evidence to substantiate the subjective factors of unwelcomeness and 
interference. Under these facts, it is improper for the school to sanc-
tion Katie for cyberbullying. 
While schools have a duty to protect students and promote values 
of civility, 184 it is not the role of school officials to police every ob-
scene phrase that students utter online. 185 Without an identifiable vic-
tim, there can be no subjective interference with anyone's learning 
environment. Consequently, the school may not interfere. 
Instead, if Katie had stated, "In case you didn't already know it, 
I'm the S*#%. All the other cheerleaders should go to hell," then the 
school officials should proceed with an analysis under the test pro-
posed by this Note, the difference being that now Katie's speech is 
182 If Lindsey sued the school district for violating her First Amendment 
rights under these circumstances, the court would analyze Lindsey's claim under this 
proposed four-factor test. 
183 Of course, if the speech constituted a real threat directed at students, such 
as the possibility of a school shooting, then it would warrant the intervention of 
school officials. 
184 See Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 681 (1986). 
185 Even though school officials may not punish Katie, they may reach out to 
her by offering her an opportunity to speak with a school guidance counselor. 
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weight is objectively severe due to the fact that eating disorders are 
most likely to develop during the teenage years. 181 
The speech would be considered more severe if it included a 
threat of physical harm, discrimination, or vulgarities such as swear 
words or inappropriate sexual innuendos. Even without those, howev-
er, Lindsey's speech is sufficiently severe, especially considering it 
incited other students to harass Amy. 
3) Unwelcomeness 
Welcome Unwelcome (Potential Cyberbullying) 
Here, Amy averred to school officials that Lindsey's speech was 
unwelcome. Even if she had not, however, the circumstantial evidence 
of unwelcomeness is very strong. Amy stopped eating lunch· and hid 
in the bathroom during her break. Amy's friend's statements further 
corroborate Amy's emotional distress. 
4) Interference in the victim's educational environment 
No Interference Interference (Potential Cyberbullying) 
Lindsey's speech altered Amy's educational environment. Amy 
complained of an inability to focus in class due to extreme anxiety. 
Moreover, Amy experienced physical exclusion as she was unable to 
walk around school or eat lunch for fear of her classmates teasing her. 
All four factors strongly support the creation of a hostile learning 
environment. In this example, Lindsey's speech rises to the level of 
cyberbullying, which triggers the school's duty to intervene and re-
strict Lindsey's speech in order to protect Amy. Accordingly, school 
181 H. W. Hoek, Incidence, prevalence and mortality of anorexia and other 
eating disorders. 19 CURRENT OPlNlON 1N PSYCHIATRY, 389-394 (2007) (Among 
young women, the prevalence of anorexia and bulimia is estimated to be 0.3% and 
1.0% respectively. Prevalence rates of anorexia and bulimia appear to increase during 
the transition from adolescence to young adulthood.). 
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officials may sanction Lindsey for her cyber speech without violating 
Lindsay's First Amendment rights. 182 
Example 2: Katie says, "In case you didn't already know it, I'm 
the S *#%. Everyone else should go to helL" 
In contrast to Example 1, Katie's cyber speech does not rise to the 
level of cyberbullying. Katie's speech is offensive due to her use of 
obscenities, yet it is not sufficiently severe because it does not dis-
criminate on the basis of race, religion, sex, gender, national origin, 
ethnicity, or sexual orientation. The lack of either a threat of physical 
harm, sexual harassment, or use of inappropriate sexual innuendos 
further illustrates that Katie's speech is not objectively severe. 
The pervasive nature of Katie's speech creates a stronger case for 
cyberbullying. Katie's speech is pervasive because it was on her Fa-
cebook wall for the general public to view. The facts here assume that 
Katie does not have restrictive privacy settings applied to her account, 
which may confine her speech to a smaller number of people. Such 
privacy settings would reduce the pervasiveness of her speech. 
Despite Katie's pervasive use of obscenities, the school cannot 
sanction Katie because her speech did not target any particular person 
or group. 183 Katie directed her speech at everyone in general but no-
body in particular. Without an identifiable victim, there is simply no 
evidence to substantiate the subjective factors of unwelcomeness and 
interference. Under these facts, it is improper for the school to sanc-
tion Katie for cyberbullying. 
While schools have a duty to protect students and promote values 
of civility, 184 it is not the role of school officials to police every ob-
scene phrase that students utter online. 185 Without an identifiable vic-
tim, there can be no subjective interference with anyone's learning 
environment. Consequently, the school may not interfere. 
Instead, if Katie had stated, "In case you didn't already know it, 
I'm the S*#%. All the other cheerleaders should go to hell," then the 
school officials should proceed with an analysis under the test pro-
posed by this Note, the difference being that now Katie's speech is 
182 If Lindsey sued the school district for violating her First Amendment 
rights under these circumstances, the court would analyze Lindsey's claim under this 
proposed four-factor test. 
183 Of course, if the speech constituted a real threat directed at students, such 
as the possibility of a school shooting, then it would warrant the intervention of 
school officials. 
184 See Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 681 (1986). 
185 Even though school officials may not punish Katie, they may reach out to 
her by offering her an opportunity to speak with a school guidance counselor. 
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directed toward an identifiable group of victims: cheerleaders. Even 
though the speech is targeted at a group of students, the speech must 
be unwelcome and interfere with at least one individual out of such 
group in order to constitute cyberbullying. 
It bears repeating that school districts must carefully balance all 
four factors of this proposed test. Indeed, the crux of this test is- the 
requirement that schools weigh each factor equally. Only then can we 
protect the victims of cyberbullying while upholding students' free-
dom of speech. 
CONCLUSION 
The four-factor sliding scale test proposed in this Note is a practi-
cal method for resolving the unique problem of cyberbullying facing 
schools today. This test provides enough flexibility to apply to differ-
ent scenarios within the ever-expanding social network scene, while 
also ensuring consistent application within school communities and 
lower courts. Furthermore, the test incorporates well-accepted and 
well-defined principles from Title VII and Title IX while preserving 
the policy underpinnings of the Tinker tetralogy. 
Most importantly, this test is designed to protect the victim by 
providing an avenue of recourse before the damage from cyberbully-
ing becomes irreparable. Indeed, as the Harris Court made clear, "Ti-
tle VII comes into play before the harassing conduct leads to a nerv-
ous breakdown."186 The same is true of this proposed test. The cases 
of Megan Meier and Tyler Clementi 187 are tragic reminders of what 
can happen when a cyberbully' s psychological torment proceeds un-
checked. This test serves as a preventive tool. It empowers students 
and schools alike to take action before the victim becomes tomorrow's 
next tragic headline. 
186 Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 22 (1993). 
187 See supra Part I. 
ANTITRUST AND PATENT LICENSE 
AGREEMENTS: A NEW LOOK AT 
THE GRANTBACK CLAUSE IN HIGH 
TECHNOLOGY MARKETS 
John M Murray* 
"[W] e must take care to guard against two extremes equally prej-
udicial; the one, that men of ability, who have employed their time for 
the service of the community, may not be deprived of their just merits, 
and the reward of their ingenuity and labor; the other, that the world 
may not be deprived of improvements, nor the progress of the arts be 
retarded "1 
INTRODUCTION 
Since the early 1990s, high technology has been a significant 
driver of economic growth in the United States. 2 Businesses are in-
creasingly turning to patented technology and innovation to streamline 
operations, boost output, or reach new markets. 3 However, few firms 
develop their own technology for internal use only, and technological 
development frequently relies on the inventions of others. Rather, 
* J.D. Candidate, 2012, Case Western Reserve University School of Law. 
B.A., University of Colorado at Boulder. The author would like to thank Professor 
Jacqueline D. Lipton for her suggestions on earlier drafts, and Thomas A. Piraino, Jr. 
for his invaluable instruction in Antitrust Law and guidance in the drafting of this 
Note. All mistakes are the author's alone. 
1 Sayre v. Moore, (1785) 102 Eng. Rep. 139, 140 (K.B.) (Lord Mansfield, 
C.J.). 
2 Thomas A. Piraino, Jr., A Proposed Antitrust Approach to High Technolo-
gy Competition, 44 WM. & MARYL. REv. 65, 67 (2002) [hereinafter High Technology 
Competition]; Jacob M. Schlesinger, Greenspan Warns on Productivity Gains-Fed 
Chairman Says Benefits From High Technology Could Soon Reach Limit, WALL ST. 
J., June 15, 1999, at A2 (discussing Alan Greenspan's comments on the role that high 
technology has played in U.S. economic growth in the 1990s: cutting production costs 
in almost every economic sector, boosting output, and restraining price increases). 
3 See Matt Murray & Raju Narisetti, Bank Mergers' Hidden Engine: Tech-
nology, WALL ST. J., Apr. 23, 1998, at B 1 (discussing the impact of high technology 
on banks' operations). 
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